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ABSTRACT 
 
Managers exercise judgment in valuing a large portion of their balance sheets.  
As a mandatory requirement of maintaining faithfully presented financial statements, 
they are required to occasionally record a change in estimate and disclose the current 
period income effect of revision of the valuation assumptions for these assets and 
liabilities.  Guidance requires managers to recognize these changes when new 
information is obtained regarding existing valuation assumptions.  Given the 
unobservable and unverifiable nature of many of these assumptions, managers have 
significant latitude in the timing of such changes.  Discretionary use of accrual accounts 
to manage earnings is well documented in accounting literature; however, the majority 
of these studies approximate discretion in accruals using models of expected accrual 
balances.  Changes in estimates, however, provide the opportunity to observe the 
influence of manager valuation judgments without having to model expected balances.  I 
find that firms tend to recognize income increasing changes in estimates advantageously 
to meet or beat analyst expectations.  Additionally, recognition of income decreasing 
changes in estimates negatively impacts the likelihood to meet or beat.  These results are 
consistent with extant earnings management literature and suggest managers time 
valuation modifications to beat expectations.  I find that this result is robust to the use of 
a propensity score matched control sample or use of a fixed effect regression comparing 
a firm quarter to other quarters for the same firm.  My results are robust to several 
changes in proxies, settings, and design choices.  This paper contributes to the literature 
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by showing a potential mechanism of earnings management.  More important, this 
mechanism—changes in estimates—has mandatory footnote disclosure, which permits 
for analysis of discretionary use of accruals without the limitation of potential 
measurement error for discretionary accruals. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 1 of the FASB Conceptual Framework states that “to a large extent, 
financial reports are based on estimates, judgments, and models rather than exact 
depictions” (FASB Concept Statement No. 8, 2010, Chapter 1, OB11).  Genworth 
Financial, Inc.’s 2013 Annual Report provides a good example of the influence of 
judgment and estimates.  The firm “reduced [its] prior year reserves by $44 million as a 
result of changes in estimates related to prior year insured events and the development of 
information and trends not previously known when establishing the reserves in prior 
periods.”  Accounting rules require that the $44 million be recorded in the current period 
as an increase in earnings of approximately seven percent.  This disclosure, located deep 
in the footnotes, exemplifies the innate subjectivity in estimate accounts as well as the 
potential magnitude of these decisions. 
I investigate whether managers manipulate earnings using the flexibility given in 
accounting guidance for estimates.  In the example above, the disclosure suggests the 
change was attributable to new information not originally known.  However, it is 
difficult as an outside party to verify when information first becomes available and, in 
turn, if it was used immediately upon discovery.  Managers could conceivably 
incorporate new information into valuation of estimates when it becomes advantageous 
for them, especially given the limited prominence of these disclosures.  If managers can 
defer recognition of changes in estimate as a sort of off-book cookie jar, they may be 
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able to recognize these changes when strongly incentivized to increase earnings, such as 
to meet or beat analyst expectations. 
Extensive research indicates that managers use accruals to manage earnings 
(Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Kothari, 
Leone, and Wasley, 2005; Collins, Pungaliya, and Vijh, 2017; among many others).  
These papers identify earnings management by separating abnormal accruals, or in other 
words the accrual component of earnings that cannot be explained, from normal 
accruals.  Delineation between normal accruals and abnormal accruals is limited by our 
ability to determine normal accruals without measurement error.  As emphasized in 
Collins et al. (2017), significant measurement error often occurs unintentionally due to 
several design choices. 
Several studies provide evidence of accrual-based earnings management using 
specific accrual accounts.  Financial statement line items with thorough disclosures such 
as the allowance for bad debts (Teoh, Wong, and Rao, 1998), claim loss reserves 
(Beatty, Ke, and Petroni, 2002; Nelson, 2000), and tax allowances (Dhaliwal, Gleason, 
and Mills, 2004; Frank and Rego, 2006) have abnormal components which correspond 
to incentives to manage earnings.  These measures, however, suffer from the same 
limitation of aforementioned discretionary accruals literature.  Specifically, it is difficult 
to disentangle measurement error from the abnormal element in an accrual balance. 
Audit literature, on the other hand, tends to take a different approach to 
researching estimate accounts.  One of the few archival audit papers on the topic, Petroni 
and Beasley (1996) use insurance company claim loss reserves to examine if auditors 
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influence the accuracy of claim loss estimates.  They find that valuation errors for these 
accounts can be quite large and occur frequently.  They show that these errors only vary 
with respect to Big N auditors for financially constrained firms.  In aggregate, their 
findings suggest auditors have a limited role in improving valuation accuracy on this 
specific estimate account.  Salterio and Koonce (1997) use an experiment to show that 
auditors tend to concur with their clients’ accounting choices when client and external 
evidence conflict with respect to the accounting treatment for an uncertain item.  
Mauldin and Wolfe (2014) find that only a minority of their sample participants 
adequately modified substantive audit procedures in response to managerial bias noted in 
control testing of an estimate account.  Griffith, Hammersley, Kadous, and Young 
(2015) use a critical thinking intervention to see if deliberate critical thinking improves 
auditors’ ability to notice inconsistencies among assumptions, other internal data, and 
external conditions.  In an effort to understand how auditors gain comfort with estimate 
accounts, Griffith, Hammersley, and Kadous (2015) interview experienced auditors and 
specifically investigate “what [auditors] do to audit estimates and how they apply the 
vague standards” (p. 83).  They find that auditors tend to rely (possibly over rely) on 
management’s assumptions and sometimes fail to critically assess the appropriateness of 
valuation assumptions relative to outside evidence.  Behavioral research supports 
conclusions of empirical testing, and PCAOB auditor inspection reports also confirm 
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these findings, frequently citing auditor deficiencies in assessing estimate accounts.1  In 
summary, audit literature on estimate accounts underlines the innate subjectivity of 
estimates and the difficulty auditors have in assessing managers’ estimates. 
Changes in estimates provide a setting to empirically analyze discretionary action 
of managers.  Similar to the aforementioned audit literature, I examine the direct impact 
of actions taken by managers by investigating whether recognition of changes in 
estimates influences the likelihood to meet or beat consensus analyst forecasted 
earnings.  Using a logistic regression to compare firm-quarters with changes in estimates 
to a control sample matched on industry, year, size, and performance, I find that firms 
recording income increasing changes are more likely to meet or beat expectations.  The 
incremental likelihood to meet or beat, based on the odds ratio, is an increase of 91.8 to 
121.4 percent relative to matched firms that did not record changes in estimates.2  
Additionally, I find that firms recording income decreasing changes are less likely to 
meet expectations.  The likelihood of meeting expectations decreases 40.6 to 48.7 
percent relative to the matched firms without changes in estimates.  These findings are 
consistent with discretionary accruals research, however the issue of measurement error 
is significantly mitigated in my analysis due to mandatory disclosure of the income 
effect of the change.  My findings therefore provide a more direct indicator of manager 
manipulation than extant models. 
                                                 
1 Griffith et al. (2015) show that roughly 70 percent of issues identified by the PCAOB during 2008 and 
2009 related to fair value, impairment, and estimation; all of these would be considered estimate accounts 
in the classification for changes in estimate disclosure. 
2 The increases in likelihood disclosed depend on the specification of the expectation threshold.  These 
values are shown in Table 3 later. 
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In additional analyses, I attempt to investigate the relationship between the 
strength of the incentive to manage earnings and the magnitude of the change in estimate 
using a well-known research design used to show how changes in tax expense 
correspond to the strength of the incentive to manage earnings (Dhaliwal et al., 2004).  I 
find that the magnitude of the change in estimate has a positive relationship with the 
strength of the incentive, reinforcing the finding that firms use estimate accounts to 
manage earnings.  I also test whether the strength of incentive influences the use of 
changes in estimates by proxying for additional motivation with the streak of 
consecutive quarters that have met or beaten expectations.  I find that the likelihood of 
meeting or beating increases with the length of the streak, consistent with prior literature.  
The use of changes in estimates to meet or beat, however, is not moderated by the length 
of the streak.   
I then supplement the original analysis with two variations using alternative 
control groups.  I find that firms recognizing changes in estimates manage earnings near 
consensus expectations in a similar manner to firms that have downward restatements of 
estimate accounts.  Using fixed effects model, I find that a firm recognizing an income 
increasing change in estimate is almost twice as likely to beat expectations relative to 
itself in other periods, while a firm recognizing an income decreasing change in estimate 
is almost half as likely to beat expectations relative to itself in other periods. 
I also investigate whether recognition of changes in estimates impacts the 
likelihood of meeting or beating expectations in other periods.  I find no evidence that 
these changes are detrimental or beneficial to contiguous quarters, suggesting managers 
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are not “borrowing” from other periods, nor are they reaping benefits from changes in 
estimates in multiple periods.  Lastly, I investigate whether results are driven by firms 
which routinely record changes in estimates.  I find that serial changers do not have a 
different relationship between recognition of changes in estimates and the likelihood to 
meet or beat expectations relative to their counterparts who record changes in estimates 
infrequently.   
My primary contribution to the literature is identification of a specific 
discretionary decision that may suggest earnings management.  Much of the literature 
focuses on overall accruals or patterns in specific line items, however we are limited in 
our ability to predict the discretionary component of these measures.  My study uses an 
accounting disclosure of an inherently discretionary managerial decision to identify 
potential earnings management, without needing a model of expected balances.  Changes 
in estimates may provide a cautionary signal to investors assessing performance near 
thresholds. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:  Chapter II establishes the 
background for my analysis on changes in estimates and develops my hypothesis based 
on prior literature.  Chapter III discusses sample selection, development of variables, and 
the research design used to test my hypothesis.  Chapter IV presents descriptive statistics 
and the results from multivariate analyses.  Chapter V provides my concluding 
discussion. 
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Background on Accounting Estimates 
Accounting guidance acknowledges the complexity of valuation for estimate 
accounts and attempts to provide a foundation for the faithful representation of these 
accounts.  In describing faithful representation, the Conceptual Framework states “an 
estimate of an unobservable price or value cannot be determined to be accurate or 
inaccurate.  However a representation of that estimate can be faithful if the amount is 
described clearly and accurately as being an estimate” (Chapter 3, QC15).  To maintain a 
faithful representation, GAAP requires firms to disclose the nature of any change and the 
current period income effect (FASB ASC 250-10-50). 3  GAAP defines changes as “a 
necessary consequence of the assessment…of the present status and expected future 
benefits and obligations associated with assets and liabilities.  Changes in accounting 
estimates result from new information” (ASC 250-10-20).  With guidance permitting 
revisions, and with only footnote disclosure, managers may perceive few negative 
consequences to using changes in estimates to manage income.  Accordingly, a change 
in estimate may provide an opportunity for discretionary action in accounting valuation. 
  
                                                 
3 Current codified guidance for changes in accounting estimates derives from SFAS 154, which was 
enacted in 2005.  This superseded APB 20: Accounting Changes.  The definition of a change in estimate, 
the accounting treatment, and the disclosure requirements are consistent across APB 20, SFAS 154, and 
ASC 250, therefore alleviating concern that implementation of regulation affects accounting for changes in 
estimates. 
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2.2 Meeting or Beating Analyst Expectations 
A change in estimate reflects revised valuation of existing assets or liabilities, but 
managers may advantageously recognize these changes by postponing revision until 
incentivized.  The incentives to revise estimate valuation vary depending on the firm’s 
performance relative to expectations since such revisions impact current period earnings.  
Much research has shown that various incentives beyond simply increasing income 
motivate accounting decisions (see Healy and Wahlen, 1999 for an in depth discussion).4 
Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) outline the hierarchy of important 
thresholds for firm earnings, demonstrating that managers appear to influence earnings 
in order to clear the following benchmarks, in order of importance: 1) zero earnings, 2) 
prior period earnings, and 3) analyst forecasted earnings.  In light of recent findings, 
specifically those of Gilliam, Heflin, and Paterson (2015), I do not investigate earnings 
management to avoid reporting losses, since evidence suggests this effect has largely 
disappeared in the post-SOX era.  Earnings relative to prior period earnings pose their 
own problems, in that managers have control over both earnings and the benchmark, 
which introduces significant complexity into matching the incentives to actions.  The 
analyst forecast benchmark, on the other hand, provides a setting where managers have 
only indirect influence on the benchmark.5 
                                                 
4 Among these incentives are income smoothing, piling losses into an already poor period, and meeting 
certain thresholds.  While I recognize the former two are potentially interesting settings, I focus on the 
latter in effort to restrict my analysis to a well-researched incentive-based earnings management setting. 
5 An extensive literature shows that managers influence analyst forecasts (Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki, 
2004; Brown and Pinello, 2007; Bradshaw, Lee, and Peterson, 2016), so I would expect to find no 
indication of earnings management relative to analyst forecasts if managers could perfectly influence 
analyst forecasts.  However, extant literature finds that managers actively manage earnings even when 
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Extant literature shows several benefits which may emphasize the incentive to 
meet or beat forecasts.  Lopez and Rees (2002) find stronger market responses to 
earnings for firms that meet benchmarks.  Kasznik and McNichols (2002) find beating 
benchmarks is associated with a short term market premium as well as future 
profitability.  Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002) find excess returns for firms that meet or 
beat relative to firms of comparable performance that did not clear their benchmarks, 
and that excess returns exist even when firms appear to have achieved this through 
earnings management.  These benefits incentivize managers who are just short of 
consensus to exercise influence over earnings to meet their thresholds. 
The most robust subset of earnings management literature focuses on the 
advantageous use of accruals (most notably: Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 
1995; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Kothari, Leone, and Wasley, 2005; Collins, Pungaliya, 
and Vijh, 2017).  While the most widely used accruals measures in the earnings 
management literature aggregate values of all accrual-based earnings, researchers have 
also documented the use of specific accrual accounts to manage earnings, notably bad 
debt expense (Teoh et al. 1998), claim loss reserves (Beatty, Ke, and Petroni, 2002; 
Nelson, 2000), and taxes (Dhaliwal et al., 2004; Frank and Rego, 2006). 
The common thread within accruals-based earnings management papers is the 
use of manager discretion in valuation.  Yet changes in estimates, which clearly indicate 
a revision of manager beliefs regarding asset valuation, have not been investigated.  
                                                 
they have managed the benchmark (Burgstahler and Eames, 2006).  My paper adds to their findings, 
specifically investigating a mechanism through which firms manage earnings around the analyst forecast. 
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Given the extent of managerial discretion innate in estimate accounts, it is reasonable to 
speculate that, consistent with the extant literature on accrual management to meet or 
beat, firms may use these accounts to beat the analyst benchmark.  Therefore I 
hypothesize: 
H1: Firms will recognize changes in estimates advantageously to meet or beat 
analyst expectations. 
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CHAPTER III  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Data and Sample Selection 
My sample begins with the intersection of Compustat and I/B/E/S data.  I require 
sufficient data on analyst following with earnings guidance.  I obtain changes in 
estimates data from Audit Analytics’ Changes in Accounting Estimates database.  This 
database contains the financial statement item (e.g. warranty, asset retirement 
obligations) and the income statement impact of the change.  Since disclosures of 
changes in estimates occur both in annual and quarterly statements, I use quarterly data 
for financial information and analyst expectations to align the managerial action with the 
most applicable analyst consensus-based incentives.  I only include observations from 
2003 to 2014 since data on changes in estimates is sparse preceding 2003.  The cross 
section of firm-quarter observations within this window is 329,940, of which 2,141 
(1,580) have income increasing (decreasing) changes in estimates. 
Next I limit the sample to only firm-quarter observations with sufficient data for 
all control variables6 as well as the lagged values for size, return on assets, growth, 
book-to-market ratio, and accruals, which are used for the propensity score match 
sample selection as outlined below.7  This restriction limits the sample to 110,843 
                                                 
6 Specifically, I require data on actual and forecasted earnings from I/B/E/S and outstanding shares, price, 
operating income, assets, and sales from Compustat. 
7 All variables for my analyses are defined in Appendix A. 
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observations, of which 1,336 (952) have income increasing (decreasing) changes in 
estimates. 
I further limit my sample to firms where the incentive to meet or beat is likely 
strongest.  Consistent with Dhaliwal et al. (2004), I only include observations whose 
absolute difference between consensus forecast and actual earnings per share is within 
five cents per share, resulting in a sample of 65,704 firm-quarter observations.8  This 
cutoff is motivated by the distribution of earnings in Brown (2001) that shows a high 
concentration of firms fall within five cents of consensus.  Firms falling within this range 
are more sensitive to earnings management incentives to meet or beat analyst 
expectations.  My results are qualitatively similar if I use an alternative cut of -$0.04 to 
$0.03 used by Doyle, Jennings, and Soliman (2013). 
Of the 65,704 firm-quarter observations, 656 (390) observations report income 
increasing (decreasing) changes in estimate.  In order to develop a stronger analysis, I 
propensity score match quarters with income increasing changes in estimates to quarters 
without a change in estimate.  I regress the likelihood of a change in estimate on lagged 
values for logged market value, return on assets, book-to-market, accruals, and 
discretionary accruals.9  I match each observation containing an income increasing 
change in estimates to the observation with the closest propensity score, conditional on 
                                                 
8 Technically, this cutoff is made based on earnings without the change in estimate in order to compare 
firms that are in similar position prior to recognition of the change in estimate.  Results are qualitatively 
similar if limiting the sample on reported earnings. 
9 In untabulated analyses, I find that the likelihood to recognize a change in estimate is primarily 
associated with these items.  This analysis was generally exploratory in nature as no literature to my 
knowledge has documented causes of recognition of a change in estimate. 
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being in the same year and Fama-French 17 industry classification, henceforth referred 
to as the PSM sample.10  This process reduces the sample to 2,439 observations, 
comprised of 1,237 observations with changes in estimate and 1,202 PSM 
observations.11 
3.2 Variables of Interest 
From the aforementioned Changes in Estimates database, I code three variables 
that outline specific characteristics of these accounting decisions.  First, an indicator 
variable, upward_chg, equal to 1 when a firm reports an income increasing change in 
estimate in the fiscal quarter and zero otherwise.  Secondly, an indicator, dnward_chg, 
equal to 1 when a firm reports an income decreasing change in estimate in the fiscal 
quarter and zero otherwise.  Last, I calculate the per share magnitude of the current 
period effect of the change (effect_eps).12   
In order to identify meet or beat observations, I use two measures of 
expectations: the consensus earnings and the most recent analyst forecast.  I calculate 
consensus (earn_consensus) using the average earnings forecast from the last forecast 
from each analyst before fiscal quarter-end.  Last_frcst is the final analyst forecast for 
                                                 
10 Matches are done with replacement, leading to treatment and PSM match samples that are unbalanced.  I 
also impose a caliper of 0.01 with no attrition of treatment firms. 
11 Thirty-five control observations match twice to treatment firms, resulting in an unbalanced sample.  This 
is a result of matching with replacement in order to obtain the best comparison, consistent with the 
suggestions in Shipman, Swanquist, and Whited (2017). 
12 Firms can report the effect on income as they deem fit, with most firms reporting the effect on pre-tax 
income, effect on net income, or effect on earnings per share.  If firms report the effect on pretax earnings, 
I use the effective tax rate for that quarter to determine the after-tax effect on income.  I then scale this 
amount by shares outstanding for diluted earnings per share to arrive at the effect on earnings per share.  I 
similarly scale the effect by outstanding shares for firms which report the effect on net income. 
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earnings prior to fiscal quarter-end.  I compare these to actual reported earnings 
(earn_report) from I/B/E/S to determine if a firm met or exceeded expected earnings.  
Specifically, meet_beat1 (meet_beat2) takes a value of 1 if reported earnings equal or 
exceed consensus (most recent) analyst expectations and zero otherwise.  I label earnings 
in excess of analyst expectations as earn_surprise1 (earn_surprise2) for reported 
earnings in excess of consensus (the last forecast).  Positive values for earn_surprise1 
(earn_surprise2) correspond to a value of one for the meetbeat1 (meetbeat2) indicator.  
Consistent with Doyle et al. (2013), I use I/B/E/S reported earnings rather than manager-
provided pro forma earnings.  Managers’ pro forma earnings typically adjust for many 
exclusions that analysts subsequently unwind in their reported earnings (Gu and Chen, 
2004).  Review of press releases indicates both analyst actual earnings and pro forma 
and GAAP earnings reflect changes in estimates, permitting analysis of either form of 
earnings in the context of my research question. 
3.3 Analysis Design 
To test the hypothesis that firms use changes in estimates advantageously, I 
compare the propensity to meet or beat analyst forecasted earnings for firms with and 
without changes in estimates.  I include the upward_chg indicator to assess the 
incremental likelihood of meeting or beating analyst expectations.  A positive coefficient 
on upward_chg would lead to rejection of the null that firms do not use changes in 
estimate to meet this specific threshold.  The logistic regression is as follows: 
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Prሺ݉݁݁ݐ ܾ݁ܽݐ#ሻ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵݑ݌ݓܽݎ݀ ܿℎ݃௜,௧ + ߚଶ݀݊ݓܽݎ݀ ܿℎ݃௜,௧ + ߚଷܾ݋݋݇ ݐ݋ ݉݇ݐ௜,௧ +
ߚସ݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,௧ + ߚହ݈݋ݏݏ௜,௧ + ߚ଺ܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ݏ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ + ߚ଼݀݅ݏܿ_ܽܿܿ௜,௧ +
ߚଽ݉݁݁ݐ ܾ݁ܽݐ#௜,௧ିଵ + ݁௜,௧        (1) 
I perform this analysis with both meet_beat1 and meet_beat2 specifications of 
exceeding expectations, with the respective dependent variables taking a value of one if 
reported earnings exceed consensus analyst expectations or the last analyst forecast.  I 
include control variables in Model 1 that have been found to be associated with meeting 
or beating analyst expectations.13  The book-to-market ratio (book_to_mkt) is measured 
as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity for the fiscal quarter.14  
Growth is calculated as the percent increase of revenues for the quarter compared to the 
corresponding quarter from the prior year.15  Loss, an indicator variable calculated using 
the reported earnings (earn_report), is 1 when firms record negative earnings for the 
quarter and zero otherwise.  ROA is calculated as quarter-to-date income (Compustat 
ibq) divided by total assets (Compustat atq).  I measure size as the natural logarithm of 
the market value of equity. 16  I also include an indicator if the firm met or exceeded 
expectations in the preceding quarter to capture a firm’s tendency to meet expectations 
in consecutive quarters and unobservable factors that may cause this. 
                                                 
13 In untabulated analyses I also include Tobin’s Q as a control, however it is generally insignificant.  I 
therefore omit it from the tabulated results. 
14 Specifically, book_to_mkt is calculated using quarterly shareholder equity (Compustat seqq) divided by 
the product of quarter-end price (Compustat prccq) and shares outstanding (Compustat cshoq). 
15 I use quarter-to-date revenue (Compustat revtq) rather than using year-to-date revenue to avoid 
confounding effects of growth in preceding quarters. 
16 All continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. 
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In order to investigate whether the influence of changes in estimates on the 
likelihood of exceeding expectations is incremental to abnormal accruals, I control for 
quarterly growth and performance adjusted Modified Jones discretionary accruals.17  I 
calculate these accruals following Collins et al. (2017), which includes additional terms 
to address backward-looking sales growth, forward-looking expected growth, and 
performance.  The model used for discretionary accruals is shown in Model 2 below. 
ܽܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏ௜,௧ = ߣ଴ + ߣଵܳଵ,௜,௧ + ߣଶܳଶ,௜,௧ + ߣଷܳଷ,௜,௧ + ߣସܳସ,௜,௧ + ߣହ൫Δݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ − Δܣܴ௜,௧൯ +
ߣ଺ܽܿܿ௜,௧ିସ + ∑ ߣ଻௞ ܴܱܣ ݀ݑ݉௞,௜,௧ + ∑ ߣ଼௞ ܵܩ ݀ݑ݉௞,௜,௧ିସ ௧௢ ௧ +
∑ ߣଽ௞ ܯܶܤ ݀ݑ݉௞,௜,௧ିଵ ௧௢ ௧ + ߦ௜,௧       (2) 
 The measurement of accruals (accruals) follows the Hribar and Collins (2002) 
approach, which uses information from the cash flow statement.18  Inclusion of 
indicators corresponding to the fiscal quarter allows for potential quarter effects on 
accruals.  Changes in sales and accounts receivable are measured as the change in both 
balances relative to the preceding quarter, consistent with the standard definition of the 
equivalent term in Modified Jones accruals models.  Inclusion of accruals for the same 
quarter in the prior year (acci,t-4) controls for potential unobservable determinants of 
accruals for a given quarter in each year.  The final series of controls in the Collins et al. 
                                                 
17 While I do not directly hypothesize earnings management evidence through changes in estimates 
incremental to that from discretionary accruals, it is necessary to include discretionary accruals to ensure 
my findings contribute to what the literature already has established regarding earnings management 
through accruals.  Results are unchanged if I exclude accruals from my analyses. 
18 Specifically, Hribar and Collins (2002) measure accruals as the sum of changes in AR, inventory, AP, 
taxes payable, and other items, all as reported within the statement of cash flows.  Collins et al. (2017) 
thoroughly discuss the omission of depreciation and amortization from the calculation of accruals.  I note 
that, consistent with their methodology, I omit these expenses and, importantly, also the term within the 
model capturing changes in fixed assets. 
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(2017) model contains indicators for ROA, sales growth, and market-to-book quintiles.  
These indicators take a value of one if the firm-quarter observation is in the 
corresponding quintile of the distribution for each ratio.  For example, a firm-quarter 
with an ROA in the lowest quintile of the distribution of ROAs for all observations will 
have an indicator for ROA_dum1,i,t and a zero for all other ROA dummy variables.  The 
intent of these dummies is to capture the relationship of accruals with each of these 
measures while not necessarily requiring a linear relationship between the ratios and the 
balance of accruals.19  Discretionary accruals (disc_acc in my analyses) is calculated as 
the residual (ξi,t) for each observation in the regression shown in Model 2. 
                                                 
19 Refer to Collins et al. (2017) for a much more detailed discussion of the motivation and calculation of 
all variables.  Their paper demonstrates how discretionary accruals calculated quarterly using a standard 
definition of Modified Jones accruals are influenced by the omission of growth and performance 
measures. 
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CHAPTER IV  
RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample of firms used in my 
analyses.  I show observations with changes in estimates separate from the PSM sample.  
The sample has 2,439 observations from 2003 to 2014, of which 1,237 report income 
increasing changes in estimates.  Differences of means between these two samples are 
insignificant and very similar between subsamples.  Specifically, observations with 
changes in estimates meet or beat both consensus analyst forecasts (73.1 percent) and the 
most recent forecast (71.6 percent) at approximately the same rate as the PSM sample 
(73.1 percent and 70.0 percent, respectively).  Prior quarter likelihood to beat 
expectations is comparable between estimate changes and the PSM sample as well.  The 
subsample with changes in estimates (PSM sample) met consensus earnings in the prior 
quarter 71.9 percent (72.1 percent) of the time and met the last forecast 70.4 percent 
(70.0 percent) of the time; neither difference is statistically significant.  The amount with 
which the firms beat consensus, earn_surprise1 (earn_surprise2), provides preliminary 
evidence of Hypothesis 1, with the mean earn_surprise1 (earn_surprise2) for 
observations with changes in estimates of $0.013 ($0.013) compared to $0.007 ($0.006) 
for the PSM sample, t statistics of 4.56 and 4.12, respectively. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
  
N mean p50 sd N mean p50 sd
meet_beat1      1,237 0.730 1.000 0.444         1,202 0.731 1.000 0.443
meet_beat2      1,237 0.716 1.000 0.451         1,202 0.700 1.000 0.458
meet_beat1_pq      1,237 0.719 1.000 0.449         1,202 0.721 1.000 0.449
meet_beat2_pq      1,237 0.704 1.000 0.457         1,202 0.700 1.000 0.458
upward_chg      1,237 0.530 1.000 0.499         1,202 0.000 0.000 0.000
dnward_chg      1,237 0.315 0.000 0.465         1,202 0.000 0.000 0.000
earn_report      1,237 0.290 0.210 0.391         1,202 0.294 0.220 0.372
earn_consensus      1,237 0.277 0.210 0.379         1,202 0.287 0.210 0.366
last_frcst      1,235 0.274 0.210 0.411         1,201 -0.736 0.210 35.331
earn_surprise1      1,237 0.013 *** 0.010 0.039         1,202 0.007 0.010 0.024
earn_surprise2      1,235 0.013 *** 0.010 0.053         1,201 0.006 0.010 0.038
effect_eps      1,237 0.009 0.001 0.034         1,202               -                -                -   
disc_acc      1,237 -0.001 0.000 0.025         1,202 -0.001 -0.001 0.025
book_to_mkt      1,237 1.282 0.930 1.294         1,202 1.200 0.836 1.260
growth      1,237 0.115 0.065 0.314         1,202 0.115 0.079 0.291
loss      1,237 0.171 0.000 0.377         1,202 0.149 0.000 0.356
roa      1,237 0.003 0.010 0.039         1,202 0.005 0.011 0.040
size      1,237 7.153 7.067 1.699         1,202 7.209 7.106 1.760
Income increasing changes in estimates Propensity-matched control observations
This table presents univariate summary statistics for key variables for observations with changes in estimates and the 
propensity score matched (PSM) control observations.  PSM observations are matched with replacement, leading to 
a smaller sample size for the PSM group.  All observations are from 2003 to 2014 and report earnings per share 
within $0.05 of consensus earnings, absent the effect of a change in estimate.  Variables are defined in Appendix A.  
Meet_beat1 is 1 for firms that report earnings greater than consensus, 0 otherwise. Meet_beat2 is 1 for firms that 
report earnings greater than the final analyst forecast, 0 otherwise  Meet_beat1_pq and meet_beat2_pq are indicators 
for the preceding quarter meet or beat. Upward_chg is 1 if firms disclose an income increasing change in estimate, 
0 otherwise.  Earn_report, earn_consensus, earn_surprise1, and earn_surprise2 are earnings per share as reported, 
mean analyst earnings forecast, earnings in excess of consensus, and earnings in excess of the final forecast, 
respectively.  Effect_eps is the per share earnings effect of the change in estimate.  Disc_acc is growth adjusted 
quarterly discretionary accruals following the Collins et al. (2017) methodology.  Book_to_mkt is the ratio of book 
value of equity to market value of equity.  Growth is the quarter-to-prior-year-quarter growth in revenues.  Profit is 1 
if firms reported positive earnings, 0 otherwise.  ROA is earnings scaled by assets. Size is the logged market value of 
equity.  All p-values in this table are two-sided.  *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively.
 20 
 
Observations have similar summary statistics for book-to-market, return on 
assets, growth, size, and discretionary accruals, which is expected since the PSM sample 
was matched on these characteristics.  As a result of this match process, the samples are 
comparable in the proportion with negative income (loss).   
Table 2 shows the pairwise correlations for all variables in the main analyses.  I 
find a positive and significant correlation between income increasing changes in 
estimates (upward_chg) and meeting or beating analyst expectations (both meet_beat1 
and meet_beat2).  I also find a negative and significant correlation between income 
decreasing changes in estimates (dnward_chg) and meeting expectations (both 
meet_beat1 and meet_beat2).  These univariate comparisons provide preliminary 
evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis.  Income increasing changes in estimates 
(upward_chg) is also positively correlated with both earning surprise measures 
(earn_surprise1 and earn_surprise2) while income decreasing changes in estimates 
(dnward_chg) has a negative correlation with both of these measures, suggesting the 
magnitude of the earnings surprise may relate to recognition of changes in estimates.  
This is further reinforced by positive correlations between the magnitude of the change 
in estimate (effect_eps) and both earn_surprise1 and earn_surprise2. 
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Table 2 
Correlation Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 meet_beat1 1.000
2 meet_beat2 0.627 1.000
3 meet_beat1_pq 0.167 0.125 1.000
4 meet_beat2_pq 0.155 0.145 0.719 1.000
5 upward_chg 0.164 0.143 0.052 0.039 1.000
6 dnward_chg -0.161 -0.131 -0.047 -0.034 -0.265 1.000
7 earn_report 0.142 0.082 0.134 0.128 0.067 -0.090 1.000
8 earn_consensus 0.082 0.033 0.126 0.121 0.036 -0.067 0.995 1.000
9 earn_surprise1 0.702 0.560 0.127 0.120 0.336 -0.240 0.230 0.141 1.000
10 earn_surprise2 0.484 0.663 0.092 0.113 0.267 -0.179 0.134 0.066 0.737 1.000
11 effect_eps 0.265 0.238 0.070 0.070 0.599 -0.432 0.224 0.164 0.631 0.508 1.000
12 disc_acc -0.005 0.025 -0.017 -0.017 0.029 -0.040 -0.019 -0.020 -0.007 0.046 0.033 1.000
13 book-to-mkt -0.066 -0.053 -0.126 -0.108 0.037 -0.005 -0.024 -0.023 -0.020 -0.009 0.031 -0.002 1.000
14 growth 0.039 0.039 0.054 0.051 -0.019 -0.012 -0.010 -0.016 0.039 0.030 0.015 0.004 -0.097 1.000
15 loss -0.203 -0.160 -0.174 -0.168 -0.028 0.075 -0.518 -0.511 -0.180 -0.104 -0.104 -0.033 0.058 -0.051 1.000
16 roa 0.151 0.120 0.178 0.162 0.054 -0.061 0.442 0.438 0.141 0.101 0.093 0.046 -0.103 0.051 -0.594 1.000
17 size 0.116 0.067 0.148 0.122 0.040 -0.062 0.568 0.569 0.118 0.060 0.090 -0.002 -0.112 -0.011 -0.356 0.344 1.000
This table shows the pairwise correlations for relevant variables.  Correlations that are significant at the 5% level are in bold print.
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To exhibit the effect of changes in estimate on earnings, I show the distribution 
of reported earnings for the sample in the panels of Figure 1.  Panel A shows the 
distribution of earnings without the effect of changes in estimates for the observations 
with income increasing changes in estimates.  I center earnings amounts on the 
corresponding analyst consensus.20  As a product of the sample definition, the 
distribution is restricted to earnings within $0.05 per share of consensus.  The 
distribution shows no stark kink in the distribution at the consensus earnings threshold.  
The peak of the distribution occurs at $0.00, right at the threshold of consensus earnings, 
and the tails appear fairly symmetrical.  Panel B shows the distribution of earnings 
centered on consensus expectations for the PSM sample.21  Consistent with Panel A, the 
sample is restricted to observations within $0.05 of consensus expectations by definition.  
As expected, the distribution shows a stark kink just below the consensus earnings 
threshold and a peak at the threshold for these observations, consistent with findings of 
other research on meeting consensus earnings (Degeorge et al., 1999).   
 
  
                                                 
20 The specific variable used for this panel is act_cadj, which is calculated as actual earnings centered on 
consensus expectations, adjusted for the change in estimate. 
21 Consistent with Panel A, the variable used for the distribution is act_cadj.  This is equivalent, however, 
to earn_surprise1 (actual reported earnings centered on consensus expectations) since the observations in 
this subset of the sample by definition have no changes in estimates. 
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Figure 1 
Distribution of Earnings Around Consensus Analyst Expectation 
  
Panel A:  Earnings Without Changes in Estimates Panel B:  Reported Earnings for the PSM Sample
Panel C:  Reported Earnings for the Changes in Estimates Sample The panels of this figure show earnings centered on the respective consensus 
analyst forecasts.  Panel A shows the distribution of earnings absent the 
change in estimate for all observations in the sample with income increasing 
changes in estimates.  Reported earnings are adjusted to back out the effect 
of the change in estimate.  Panel B (Panel C) shows reported earnings for the 
propensity score matched control sample (observations with income 
increasing changes in estimates).  Panel B shows a kink in the distribution of 
firms at zero.  Specifically, we see far fewer firms $0.01 below expecations 
that would be expected absent earnings management, consistent with much 
of the literature.  Panel C shows the same pattern for the firms with changes 
in estimates.  Panel A, however, shows earnings for these firms absent the 
changes in estimates and evidences that the distribution no longer exhibits 
the kinked nature seen in the other panels.
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Panel C shows the comparable distribution of earnings centered on consensus 
expectations for the subsample with income increasing changes in estimates.  The first 
item of note is that the distribution expands beyond $0.05 of consensus, showing that the 
impact of the changes in estimates has a material effect on earnings.  Secondly and 
perhaps more important, the kink in the distribution seen for the control sample is 
mirrored in this subsample.  When comparing to the distribution for earnings adjusted 
for the change in estimate (Panel A), this suggests firms that would fall just below their 
consensus expectations appear to move up in the distribution.  In fact, the bar height for 
a penny below expectations is shorter than either neighboring bar and the peak occurs at 
the consensus with bars corresponding to $0.01 and $0.02 much higher than expected 
absent earnings management.  These charts pictorially demonstrate how earnings 
management may occur through the use of changes in estimates. 
4.2 Meet or Beat Through Changes in Estimates 
Table 3 presents the multivariate logistic regressions predicting likelihood to 
meet or beat (meet_beat1 and meet_beat2 in Panels A and B, respectively) as a function 
of changes in estimate (upward_chg and dnward_chg) and other controls typically found 
to have an association with likelihood to meet or beat.  As predicted in Hypothesis 1, 
panel A shows the coefficient on upward_chg is significantly positive (Z-stat=6.10) and 
the coefficient on dnward_chg is significantly negative (Z-stat=5.31), suggesting that 
firm-quarters with income increasing (decreasing) changes in estimates are more (less) 
likely to meet or beat analyst consensus forecast.  The odds ratio suggests that the 
likelihood of beating analyst expectations increases 121.4 percent when an income 
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increasing change in estimate is recognized and decreases 48.7 percent when 
recognizing an income decreasing change in estimate, holding all else constant.  In this 
model, statistically significant control variables have the predicted association with the 
likelihood to meet or beat.  Panel B reinforces the conclusion drawn from panel A, with 
a significantly positive (negative) coefficient on upward_chg (dnward_chg) when 
predicting the likelihood of meeting or beating the most recent analyst forecast (Z-
stat=5.42 and Z-stat=4.23 for upward_chg and dnward_chg, respectively).  The odds 
ratios imply that the likelihood of beating the most recent analyst forecast increases 
(decreases) 91.8 percent (40.6 percent) when a firm recognizes an income increasing 
(decreasing) change in estimate.  In untabulated analyses, I replace the indicators 
upward_chg and dnward_chg with the magnitude of the change in estimate (effect_eps) 
and results are unchanged, further reinforcing the relationship between recognized 
changes in estimate and the likelihood to meet or beat expectations. 
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Table 3 
Logistic Regression of Meet or Beat on Changes in Estimates 
  
Panel A:  Consensus Forecast and Change in Estimate Indicator
Variable Pred Sign Coef. Std. Err. z Two-tail P>z
upward_chg + 0.795 0.130 6.10 0.000 0.000
dnward_chg - -0.667 0.126 -5.31 0.000 0.000
book_to_mkt - -0.024 0.039 -0.62 0.533 0.267
growth + 0.262 0.161 1.63 0.102 0.051
loss - -0.893 0.156 -5.72 0.000 0.000
roa + 0.982 1.499 0.65 0.513 0.257
size + 0.069 0.033 2.11 0.035 0.018
disc_acc + -1.447 1.946 -0.74 0.457 0.229
meet_beat1_pq + 0.571 0.106 5.40 0.000 0.000
Fama-French-17 FE YES
Year Fixed Effects YES
Observations 2,439
Psuedo R2 0.101
Area Under ROC 0.714
Panel B:  Last Forecast and Change in Estimate Indicator
Variable Pred Sign Coef. Std. Err. z Two-tail P>z
upward_chg + 0.651 0.120 5.42 0.000 0.000
dnward_chg - -0.520 0.123 -4.23 0.000 0.000
book_to_mkt - -0.036 0.038 -0.95 0.340 0.170
growth + 0.285 0.156 1.83 0.068 0.034
loss - -0.709 0.153 -4.63 0.000 0.000
roa + 0.676 1.470 0.46 0.646 0.323
size + 0.015 0.031 0.49 0.626 0.313
disc_acc + 1.565 1.873 0.84 0.403 0.202
meet_beat2_pq + 0.513 0.101 5.1 0.000 0.000
Fama-French-17 FE YES
Year Fixed Effects YES
Observations 2,439
Psuedo R2 0.070
Area Under ROC 0.675
This table reports the logistic regression results for Model 1.  All variables are defined in 
Appendix A.  Reported p-values are one tailed.  The sample includes all firm-quarter 
observations with sufficient data from 2003 to 2014 that report income increasing 
changes in estimates and the propensity score matched sample of control firms.  Panels A 
and B (Panels C and D) report the regression results predicting the likelihood of meeting 
or beating expectations using the indicator for an income increasing change in estimate 
(the magnitude of the change in estimate).  Panels A and C (Panels B and D) define 
expectations using the consensus forecast (last analyst forecast).
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4.3 Additional Analyses 
The following sections discuss a series of additional analyses to further explore 
the robustness of the relationship between meeting or beating and changes in estimates.  
I first investigate whether the size of the recognized change in estimate has an 
association with the incentive to manage earnings.  The next two sections test the 
relationship between likelihood to meet or beat and changes in estimates with alternative 
control samples.  I then look to see if these changes influence other periods and if I can 
isolate firms that are likely managing earnings from those that may be recording these 
changes through proper accounting.  Then I separate firms into those that routinely or 
infrequently report changes in estimates to investigate if they use changes in estimates 
differently for beating expectations.  Lastly I investigate whether firms with increased 
incentives due to a streak of beating expectations use changes in estimates differently. 
4.3.1 Magnitude of Changes in Estimates 
The results reported in Table 3 show that recognition of changes in estimates 
influences the likelihood of meeting or beating expectations.  Next, I consider the 
relationship between influence and the magnitude of the change.  I adopt the research 
design from Dhaliwal et al. (2004), who show earnings management through tax 
accounts by modeling changes in tax rates as a function of the strength in the incentive 
to meet or beat.  They proxy for the incentive to manage earnings with the distance from 
the consensus using outdated previous estimate of effective tax rate and include an 
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indicator equal to 1 if the firm would have missed consensus with this tax rate.22  The 
dependent variable is the reduction in effective taxes from the outdated rate, with the 
coefficient on the interaction showing the incremental reduction attributable to 
potentially missing consensus. 
My analysis parallels theirs in showing how the magnitude of a change in 
estimate varies with respect to the amount with which the firm would miss their 
consensus earnings.  Figure 2 demonstrates the calculation of relevant variables for this 
analysis.  I define my dependent variable, effect_eps, as the per-share earnings effect of 
the change in estimate, consistent with earlier specifications of the magnitude of the 
effect.  The proxy for the incentive to manage earnings, under_over_wo, is calculated as 
the difference between consensus earnings (earn_consensus) and what earnings would 
have been absent the change in estimate.23  I include an indicator (miss_wo) for 
observations that would have missed the expected earnings without recognition of the 
change in estimate.  In Model 3 below, the coefficient on miss_wo*under_over_wo 
represents the incremental effect of the incentive to manage earnings for firms that 
would fall under their consensus forecast without the change in estimate. 
݂݂݁݁ܿݐ_݁݌ݏ௜,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ݉݅ݏݏ ݓ݋௜,௧ + ߚଶݑ݊݀݁ݎ ݋ݒ݁ݎ ݓ݋௜,௧ + ߚଷ݉݅ݏݏ ݓ݋௜,௧ ∗
ݑ݊݀݁ݎ ݋ݒ݁ݎ ݓ݋௜,௧ + ݁௜,௧        (3) 
                                                 
22 Dhaliwal et al. (2004) state “to measure incentives to manage earnings, we assert that a firm has such an 
incentive if it would have missed its earnings target based on unmanaged earnings (earnings absent tax 
expense management).” 
23 The actual calculation for under_over_wo is earn_consensus – (earn_report – effect_eps).  Positive 
(negative) values for under_over_wo represent the amount a firm falls under (over) its consensus earnings. 
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Figure 2 
Calculation of Variables for the Analysis of the Relationship between Incentive and 
Estimate Magnitude 
 
earn_consensus
earn_reportearn_wo
effect_eps
under_over_wo
miss_wo = 1
This figure outlines the calculation of the variables of interest for the analysis of the relationship between 
the incentive to manage earnings and the magnitude of the change in estimate recorded.  Variables used in 
the analysis are in italics.  Effect_eps is the per-share magnitude of the change in estimate.  This amount is 
used to reduce reported earnings, (earn_report) to an adjusted earnings per share (earn_wo).  The distance 
from the adjusted earnings to the consensus (earn_consensus) is under_over_wo.  A positive value for 
under_over_wo, let's say $0.03 for example, suggests a firm would have missed its consensus by $0.03 
without the change in estimate.  Miss_wo is an indicator that takes the value of 1 for all positive values of 
under_over_wo. and zero otherwise.
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I expect a positive relationship between effect_eps and how far under the 
consensus a firm would be without the change in estimate (miss_wo*under_over_wo).24  
I expect the main effect of miss_wo to be positive as well, which indicates that firms 
failing to meet consensus record changes that are larger than those above their 
consensus, with this difference not corresponding to the distance from the consensus.  
Table 4 Panel A shows the results of these analyses.25 
 
  
                                                 
24 This prediction initially seems contrary to Dhaliwal et al. (2004), who predict a negative relationship 
between tax rate changes and the incentive to manage earnings.  The key difference is that earnings 
management manifests itself through a reduction in taxes in their analysis but through an increase in the 
magnitude of a change in estimate in my analysis.  While the coefficients work in opposite directions, both 
predict an increase in earnings management as the incentive to manage earnings increases. 
25 I do not have an expectation for the main effect of under_over_wo since this is the relationship between 
incentive to manage earnings and the magnitude of the change in estimate for firms which beat consensus 
absent the change in estimate.  It is unclear how a surplus beyond the consensus would influence the 
incentive to increase earnings in this limited setting.  My interpretation is contrary to the interpretation in 
Dhaliwal et al. (2004), however the coefficient in their setting is insignificant. 
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Table 4 
Influence of Incentive to Manage Earnings on the Magnitude of Estimate Changes 
 
Panel A:  Regression
Variable Pred. sign Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
miss_wo + -0.001 0.004 -0.20 0.420
under_over_wo ? 0.173 0.071 2.44 0.015
miss_wo*under_over_wo + 0.197 0.129 1.52 0.064
Year Fixed Effects YES
Adjust R2 0.043
Observations 1237
Panel B: Subsample means
Subset effect_eps under_over_wo
miss_wo=1 0.010 0.026
earn_report < earn_consensus -0.002 0.027
earn_report ≥ earn_consensus 0.048 0.023
t-statistic 29.155 *** 3.074 ***
These analyses are performed all firm-quarter observations from 2003 to 2014 
within $0.05 of consensus which recognize an income increasing change in 
estimates. P-values in this table are one-sided.  *, **, and *** represent significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A shows the regression of per-share magnitude of income increasing changes 
in estimates (effect_eps) on the spread between pre-change in estimate earnings and 
the consensus forecast (under_over_wo).  Miss_wo is an indicator equal to 1 when 
the firm would have missed consensus without the change in estimate.  
Under_over_wo is the per share distance between earnings absent the change in 
estimate and the consensus forecast.  This variable is positive for firms that would 
have missed consensus (under consensus) and negative for firms that exceed the 
consensus (over consensus).  The coefficient on miss_wo*under_over_wo indicates 
the incremental association between the incentive to manage earnings and the 
magnitude of the change in estimate for firms that would have fallen under their 
consensus earnings without the change in estimate.
Panel B shows the mean values for the effect of the change in estimate (effect_eps) 
and the under-/over-consensus amount for earnings without the change in estimate 
(under_over_wo).  All observations that would have missed consensus are shown in 
the first row.  The second (third) row shows the subset of these observations that 
reported earnings that missed (met or beat) consensus.  The t-statistic for the 
difference between these subsets is reported in the final row.
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Panel A shows a positive relation (coefficient=0.197, p-value=0.064) between 
the magnitude of the change in estimate (effect_eps) and the incentive to manage 
earnings (miss_wo*under_over_wo).  This suggests that firms that would have fallen 
under their consensus without the change in estimate increase the magnitude of the 
change corresponding to the magnitude of the shortfall.  Miss_wo is insignificant 
suggesting, ceteris paribus, that firms that would fall under their consensus absent the 
change record a change in estimate that, on average, is no larger than those that beat 
consensus without the change. 
These results suggest managers change estimate accounts in response to 
incentives to meet or beat; however, they do not address the extent to which earnings 
management through changes in estimates is successful.  Panel B shows the association 
between the magnitude of the change in estimate and the outcome of actually meeting 
and beating consensus.  In this specific analysis I examine only observations that would 
have missed their benchmark absent the change in estimate (observations that have a “1” 
for miss_wo).  These firms record changes with a per-share earnings effect of $0.01, on 
average, but are $0.026 under consensus without the estimate revision.  This 
immediately indicates that some of these firms are unsuccessful in meeting expectations.  
The subset of these observations reporting earnings that meet or exceed consensus 
(earn_report ≥ earn_consensus) has significantly larger changes in estimates than those 
that do not beat expectations (earn_report < earn_consensus), with mean per-share 
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changes in earnings of $0.048 and -$0.002, respectively.26  This suggests that the 
managers that were successful in meeting expectations did so using significantly larger 
changes in estimates, which would not be expected if the magnitude of changes in 
estimates was unrelated to earnings management.  I further assess how these firms differ 
prior to recording the change in estimate by showing the difference in earnings absent 
the change in estimate (under_over_wo), finding that firms that failed to exceed 
expected earnings were $0.027 under consensus, which is lower than the $0.023 under 
consensus for those that reported earnings in excess of consensus.  The difference 
between these groups is significant (p-value=0.000).  These results further support that 
managers attempting to meet or beat using changes in estimates do so effectively.27 
These results should be interpreted within the context of the research design.  
Specifically, the relationship observed is based strictly on firms that record a change in 
estimate.  While the analysis in Table 3 suggests managers revise estimates to meet or 
beat expectations, the analyses in Table 4 only model the relationship between incentives 
to manage earnings and the magnitude of the change, conditional on recognition of a 
change. 
4.3.2 Changing or Restating Estimate Accounts 
The next analysis aims to compare changes in estimates to a group of 
observations presumed to manage earnings.  By replacing the comparison group with 
                                                 
26 Result robust to a difference in medians as well. 
27 The results in Panel A and Panel B are consistent with the exclusion of income decreasing changes in 
estimates. 
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observations that manage earnings, the coefficient of interest in this specification 
indicates meet or beat likelihood that is different from earnings managing observations.  
An insignificant coefficient on upward_chg would indicate that observations with 
income increasing changes in estimates are equally as likely to beat expectations as the 
earnings managing observations.  I identify earnings managing observations by isolating 
quarters that are subsequently restated.   
Donelson, McInnis, and Mergenthaler (2013) use restatements to document 
earnings manipulation around analyst expectations.  They document a discontinuity in 
the distribution of earnings as originally reported just below expected earnings for a 
sample of firms with securities class action suits.  This discontinuity, however, 
disappears when observing the distribution of restated earnings relative to the original 
analyst expectations.  The authors suggest this shows evidence of “managed earnings” 
which subsequently correct as a result of securities class action suits and restatements.  
Using a different sample, it is an open question whether the distribution of earnings as 
originally reported for firms which restate estimate accounts would behave similarly.  A 
comparison between restated estimate accounts and those changed in the period would 
then show whether firms are performing earnings management outside of or within 
GAAP. 
In order to perform any comparison between changes in estimates and 
restatements of estimates, I must isolate restatements of estimate accounts.  In order to 
identify restatements for estimate accounts, I extract all line item descriptions of both 
changes in estimates and restatements from Audit Analytics and include only the 
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restatements which have similar descriptions to changes in estimates.  For example, the 
Changes in Estimates database contains a line item for “capitalization of expenditures – 
prepaid assets, other assets, etc.” and the restatement database has a similar 
“capitalization of expenditures issues” category.  I exclude restatements that do not 
relate to estimate accounts (e.g. cash flow statement (SFAS 95) classification errors) and 
restatements due clerical error since the design of this analysis assumes manager 
discretion of accounting for these accounts, and clerical error adds noise to this 
assumption.  Appendix C provides more detail on the process of identifying estimate 
restatements. 
Upon defining a sample of firm-quarter observations containing either a change 
in estimate or a restatement of an estimate account, I further limit the sample to only 
changes in estimates and restatements that improve earnings in the current period.  
Specifically, this includes income increasing changes in estimates and restatements that 
subsequently reduce earnings.  The intuition behind the income increasing changes in 
estimates, as discussed earlier, is that managers recognize a change in estimate to 
improve earnings to satisfy expectations.  Restatements, on the other hand, represent a 
delay in recognition of a downward change in estimate which permits the firm to meet or 
beat expectations.  I then limit the sample to firms which are within $0.05 of consensus 
absent the effect of the change in estimate or with restated earnings, consistent with the 
primary analyses.28  The final sample of observations for this analysis contains 2,221 
                                                 
28 In order to calculate this cutoff, I first calculate the current period effect of the estimate (est_adj).  For 
changes in estimates (upward_chg = 1), this is the effect of the change, as disclosed in the financial 
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observations, of which 578 have income increasing changes in estimates and the 
remainder have downward restatements.29 
 
  
                                                 
statements.  For restated observations, (upward_chg = 0), this is the difference between earnings as first 
reported and restated earnings.  I then subtract est_adj from reported earnings (earn_report) to arrive at 
what I call true earnings (true_earn).  I require observations to be within $0.05 of consensus earnings 
using true earnings. 
29 The number of observations with income increasing changes in estimates here differs from that in the 
primary analysis due to exclusion of observations with both changes in estimates and a restatement of 
estimate accounts.  While this subset of firms is potentially interesting, it adds unnecessary complexity.  I 
therefore exclude these observations for the purpose of this analysis. 
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Figure 3 
Distribution of Earnings around Consensus Analyst Expectation for Estimate Changes and Restatements 
  Panel A:  Reported Earnings Surprise for Restated Observations Panel B:  Earnings Surprise Adjusted for Effect of Restatement
Panel C:  Reported Earnings Surprise for Estimate Changers Panel D:  Earnings Surprise Without the Change in Estimate
The panels of this figure show earnings centered on the respective consensus analyst forecasts for observations which increase income either through incorrect accounting 
(Panel A and Panel B) that is subsequently restated or through changes in estimates (Panel C and Panel D).  Panel A and Panel C show the reported earnings for these firms, 
both of which show peaks above consensus analyst forecast.  Panel B shows restated earnings relative to consensus forecasts, and demonstrates a leftward shift in this 
distribution as well.  Panel D backs out the effect of the change in estimate, which moves the peak of the distribution below the consensus.  In aggregate, these histrograms 
show the similarity in firms which change estimates and those which incorrectly account for estimate accounts and subsequently restate their financial statements.
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Table 5 
Likelihood to Meet or Beat – Changes in Estimates Versus Restatements 
 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics
Variable N mean p50 sd N mean p50 sd
meet_beat1 578 0.875 ** 1.000 0.331 1643 0.834 1.000 0.372
upward_chg 578 1.000 1.000 0.000 1643 0.000 0.000 0.000
earn_report 578 0.357 *** 0.270 0.409 1643 0.246 0.180 0.304
earn_consensus 578 0.323 *** 0.240 0.399 1643 0.223 0.150 0.295
true_earn 578 0.320 *** 0.235 0.400 1643 0.216 0.140 0.297
true_meetbeat 578 0.478 ** 0.000 0.500 1643 0.422 0.000 0.494
est_adj 578 0.038 *** 0.020 0.039 1643 0.029 0.020 0.028
Panel B:  Likelihood to Meet or Beat for Changes in Estimates Relative to Restatements
Variable Pred Sign Coef. Std. Err. z P>z
upward_chg ? 0.226 0.161 1.40 0.161
book_to_mkt - 0.023 0.032 0.70 0.485
growth + 0.239 0.105 2.26 0.024
profit + 0.571 0.153 3.74 0.000
roa + -0.296 0.208 -1.42 0.155
size + -0.034 0.038 -0.91 0.363
2-digit SIC Fixed Effects YES
Year Fixed Effects YES
Observations 2,221
Psuedo R2 0.071
Area Under ROC 0.674
Panel C:  Likelihood to Meet or Beat with True Earnings for Changes in Estimates Relative to Restatements
Variable Pred Sign Coef. Std. Err. z P>z
upward_chg ? 0.100 0.112 0.89 0.371
book_to_mkt - 0.037 0.021 1.75 0.081
growth + 0.004 0.059 0.08 0.940
profit + 0.344 0.117 2.95 0.003
roa + -0.220 0.114 -1.93 0.054
size + 0.001 0.027 0.03 0.977
2-digit SIC Fixed Effects YES
Year Fixed Effects YES
Observations 2,221
Psuedo R2 0.042
Area Under ROC 0.627
Income increasing changes in estimates Downward Estimate Restatements
This table shows the analyses of the relationship between accounting treatment for estimates and the likelihood to meet or 
beat, comparing firms with changes in estimates to firms that later restate estimate accounts.  All variables are defined in 
Appendix A.  Panel A provides descriptive statistics for relevant variables.  Panel B and Panel C predict the likelihood to 
meet or beat consensus forecasts with the effect of accounting treatment of estimates and without the effect of accounting 
treatment, respectively.  The coefficient on upward_chg should indicate if firms that record changes in estimates manage 
earnings more or less than firms that later restate estimate accounts.  All tests of significance are two-tailed.
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Figure 3 shows histograms of earnings relative to consensus forecast.  Panel A 
and Panel B demonstrate how a leftward shift in the peak of the distribution occurs when 
revising earnings from as first reported (Panel A) to restated (Panel B), consistent with 
the findings of Donelson et al. (2013).  Panel C shows the analogue to Panel A for firms 
with income increasing changes in estimates.  Panel D then shows the distribution of 
earnings relative to consensus forecast absent the effect of the change in estimate.  The 
leftward shift from Panel C to Panel D mirrors that of the restated observations.  This 
provides preliminary evidence which suggests firms may use changes in estimates to 
manage earnings, much like those that subsequently restate.30 
Panel A of Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the sample of quarters with 
income increasing changes in estimates and quarters which are later restated downward.  
Both subsets have a high likelihood of meeting or beating, partially due to the sample 
parameters.  The firms that recognize changes in estimates are slightly more likely to 
meet or beat consensus with 87.5 percent of the observations exceeding expectations 
compared to 83.4 percent for firms that restate downward.  By construction, upward_chg 
is 1 for all observations with a change in estimate and 0 for all observations that later 
restate.  Both reported earnings ($0.36 per share) and expected earnings ($0.32 per 
share) are significantly higher for the change in estimate subset compared to $0.25 per 
                                                 
30 It is important to note that while I refer to restated earnings and earnings less the effect of the change in 
estimate as true_earn, I do so out of convenience and not to suggest that all of these firms are managing 
earnings.  Given the proximity of the earnings threshold and the robustness of literature supporting the 
earnings management conclusion to meet expectations, I generally refer to this phenomena as I believe it 
occurs on average. 
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share and $0.22 per share, respectively for restated quarters.31  True_earn is higher on 
average for quarters with changes in estimates, however the portion of firms that meet 
consensus expectations drops significantly for both (47.8 percent for changes in 
estimates and 42.2 percent for restated observations).  The income effect of the accrual 
treatment is significantly larger for changes in estimates ($0.04 per share) compared to 
restated observations ($0.03),32 suggesting that firms may, on average, be more 
egregious with changes in estimates than with the postponing of a revision and 
subsequent restatement. 
Panel B shows the results of the logistic regression predicting the likelihood of 
meeting or beating consensus as shown in Model 1.  In this execution of the model, the 
coefficient on upward_chg represents the incremental likelihood to meet or beat for a 
firm that changes its estimate relative to those that subsequently restate, after controlling 
for other financial ratios which literature suggests influence the likelihood to meet or 
beat.  Given the results of Donelson et al. (2013) and other papers suggesting firms 
manage earnings to beat expectations and subsequently restate their financials, I would 
expect upward_chg to have a positive (negative) coefficient if firms recognizing changes 
in estimates are more (less) aggressive at managing earnings relative to the firms that 
omit revision to an estimate and later restate it.  The coefficient is, however, insignificant 
                                                 
31 Earn_report (T-stat=6.89) and earn_consensus (T-stat=6.30) are significantly different between 
samples. 
32 T-statistic of 5.94. 
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(p-value=0.161), suggesting these firms are no more or less likely to beat expectations 
after controlling for other predictors. 
In order to see if these firms start at a different position, Panel C investigates 
whether firms with changes in estimates would have been more likely to meet or beat 
compared to restated observations, absent the accounting treatment.  I perform the same 
analysis as performed in Panel B, however I replace the dependent variable (meet_beat1) 
with whether earnings absent the accounting for the estimate would beat consensus 
expectations (true_beat).  The coefficient on upward_chg in this model should shed light 
on whether firms that change estimates and firms that later restate differ in their starting 
point relative to expectations prior to determining accounting treatment.  The coefficient 
is insignificant (p-value=0.371), suggesting these firms start, on average, no different 
relative to their respective benchmarks. 
Overall, it is difficult to conclude something definitively based on insignificant 
coefficients.  That being said, given extant literature document earnings management by 
firms which later restate earnings downward, finding no difference between those 
observations and the subset that changes estimates provides some corroborating 
evidence that changes in estimates are used advantageously. 
4.3.3 Timing of the Change in Estimate – Fixed Effects Approach 
 While the preceding analysis addresses the issue of whether I have an appropriate 
comparison group, it is difficult to conclusively say whether it is the most appropriate 
comparison.  In effort to further address this, I elect next to compare the firm only to 
itself in a fixed effect regression.  In this analysis, all observations come from firms that 
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at one point report a change in estimate.  I include firm-quarter observations containing 
changes in estimates as well as all other quarters for those firms with no changes in 
estimates.  The latter set serves as the direct comparison for the same-firm observations 
with changes in estimates. 
 Table 6 shows the results from the fixed effect logistic regression predicting the 
likelihood to meet or beat consensus earnings expectations.  The coefficient on 
upward_chg (dnward_chg) evidences any incremental increase or decrease in likelihood 
of a firm to beat expectations in a quarter it records an income increasing (decreasing) 
change in estimate relative to quarters in which it does not record a change.  The 
coefficients for upward_chg and dnward_chg are both significant in the predicted 
directions (p-value < 0.0001 for both), suggesting a change in estimate influences the 
likelihood for a firm to beat expectations.  The odds ratios (2.033 and 0.553, 
respectively) suggest a firm, ceteris paribus, is almost twice as likely to beat expectations 
in a quarter with an income increasing change in estimate and nearly half as likely to 
beat expectations in a quarter with an income decreasing change in estimate, relative to 
other quarters. 
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Table 6 
Logistic Fixed Effect Regression of Meet or Beat on Changes in Estimates 
  
Variable Pred Sign Coef. Std. Err. t P>z
upward_chg ? 0.710 0.111 6.37 <.0001
dnward_chg ? -0.593 0.088 -6.73 <.0001
book_to_mkt + -0.046 0.009 -4.91 <.0001
growth ? 0.003 0.004 0.65 0.516
loss - -0.659 0.052 -12.69 <.0001
roa + 1.331 0.342 3.89 0.000
size + 0.077 0.013 6.17 <.0001
disc_acc ? -0.970 0.545 -1.78 0.038
meet_beat1_pq + 0.556 0.035 16.10 <.0001
2-digit SIC Fixed Effects NO
Year Fixed Effects YES
Observations 27,368
Psuedo R2 0.080
Area Under ROC 0.656
This table reports the logistic fixed effects regression results for Model 1.  All 
variables are defined in Appendix A.  Reported p-values are one tailed.  The 
sample includes all firm-quarter observations with sufficient data from 2003 
to 2014 that report income increasing changes in estimates and all quarters 
from those firms which do not contain changes in estimates.  The firm's 
quarters without income increasing changes in estimates serve as the control 
group for the observations with changes in estimates.
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 These results reinforce the conclusion that firms may use changes in estimates 
advantageously.  When comparing the influence of a change in estimate on the 
likelihood to meet or beat, I find that a firm is more likely to meet or beat expectations 
when it records an income increasing change in estimate and less likely to meet or beat 
expectations when it records an income decreasing change in estimate, relative even to 
itself in other periods. 
4.3.4 Changes in Estimates Influencing Meeting or Beating in Contiguous Quarters 
 A common comment regarding accruals earnings management—“accruals 
reverse”—suggests that increasing income through a change to an accrual may impact 
another period when it reverses.  Another possibility is that the change in estimate 
follows a buildup of a reserve in a preceding period.  In effort to address these 
possibilities, I perform the analysis outlined in Model 1 regressing one quarter behind 
and one quarter ahead likelihood to meet or beat expectations.  If the change in estimate 
reverses in the next period, then there should be a lower likelihood of meeting or beating 
expectations.  Similarly, if a reserve has been built prior to the change in estimate and 
recognition of the change is, in essence, emptying the reserve, then I would expect a 
lower likelihood of meeting or beating expectations in the preceding period. 
 Table 7 tabulates the analyses outlined above.  The middle rows of Panels A and 
B correspond to the coefficients of interest seen in Panels A and B of Table 3, 
respectively.  The coefficients on upward_chg and dnward_chg predicting the likelihood 
to meet or beat in the prior quarter (Panel A) are positive and negative, respectively, 
however neither is statistically significant.  This holds true for the comparable 
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coefficients in Panel B, with directions consistent with predictions but neither being 
significant.  The coefficients on upward_chg and dnward_chg in the regressions 
modeling the likelihood to meet or beat in the subsequent quarter are also insignificant in 
both Panel A and Panel B, suggesting the change in estimates do not influence the next 
period. 
 While these regressions may imply the effect of the change in estimate does not 
influence other periods, the results should be interpreted with caution.  First, I limit the 
analysis to contiguous quarters and do not look further outside of that range.  It is 
possible the building of a reserve or the reversal of the change occur several quarters 
prior to or after recognition of the change in estimate.  Second, it is possible earnings in 
other periods were lower as a result of the change in estimate but the expectation was 
effectively influenced by managers to incorporate the lower earnings.  For example, if a 
firm changes an estimate in a quarter and the effect reverses in the subsequent quarter, 
managers may provide guidance for the subsequent quarter that lowers expectations.  
The firm therefore may have no change in future likelihood to meet or beat expectations 
even with lower future income. 
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Table 7 
Effect of Changes in Estimates on Contiguous Periods 
 
Panel A:  Consensus Forecast and Change in Estimate Indicator Panel B:  Last Forecast and Change in Estimate Indicator
Period Period
Prior Quarter 0.144 -0.146 Prior Quarter 0.0961 -0.0828
(0.116) (0.133) (0.112) (0.131)
Quarter of Change in Estimate 0.795 *** -0.667 *** Quarter of Change in Estimate 0.649 *** -0.514 ***
(0.130) (0.126) (0.120) (0.123)
Subsequent Quarter -0.003 0.177 Subsequent Quarter 0.0531 0.130
(0.112) (0.137) (0.109) (0.133)
(Std. Err.)
Coefficient on 
upward_chg
Coefficient on 
dnward_chg
Coefficient on 
upward_chg
Coefficient on 
dnward_chg
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)(Std. Err.)
This table reports the coefficients on the variables of interest in several alternative specifications of Model 1, as originally tested in Table 
3.  Specifically, the timing of the measurement of the dependent variable varies in each regression to assess if contiguous quarters to that 
of the change in estimate are influenced by the change in estimate.  Each panel reports the coefficient and standard error corresponding 
the the variable of interest in the quarter before, of, and after recognition of an income increasing change in estimate.  Panels A and B 
report the regression results predicting the likelihood of meeting or beating consensus forecast and last forecast, respectively.
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4.3.5 Excluding Observations Not Expected to Manage Earnings 
 While the primary results suggest firms use changes in estimates to manage 
earnings, it is likely some of these firms simply benefit from doing proper accounting 
and appropriately recording the change.  I attempt to identify these observations and 
remove them from my analysis.  To do so, I look at the quarters preceding the period 
with a change in estimate to see if a firm could have beaten a missed threshold had it 
recorded the change in estimate in an earlier period.33  The intuition behind this is that 
the firm would have presumably recognized the change in estimate in the earlier period 
to beat expectations if it was using such adjustments advantageously.  This eliminates 
190 observations from the change in estimate sample in the main analysis and the 
corresponding matched control observations.  Excluding these observations results in a 
sample of 2,073 observations. 
 Panel A of Table 8 shows selected descriptive statistics for this revised sample, 
with 72.9 percent (71.6 percent) of observations with changes in estimates meeting or 
beating consensus analyst forecast (the most recent forecast).  These values are not 
significantly different from those in the original sample, nor do they differ significantly 
from the values corresponding to the control sample (71.1 and 69.3 percent, 
respectively). 
                                                 
33 Specifically, for observations in the second, third, or fourth quarter of a fiscal year, I look at whether the 
firm missed consensus expected earnings in the preceding quarters within that year.  If the firm missed 
expectations but would have beaten expectations had it recorded the change in estimate in such quarter, I 
categorize that firm as less likely to be managing earnings in the period it recorded the change in estimate 
and remove these observations for this analysis.  If an observation with a change in estimate occurs in the 
first quarter of the fiscal year, I perform the same review, however only looking back to the fourth quarter 
of the preceding fiscal year. 
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 Panel B shows the results of the logistic regression predicting the likelihood to 
meet or beat, as shown in Model 1.  In this analysis, firms with income increasing 
(decreasing) changes in estimates are significantly more (less) likely to meet or beat 
expectations (Z-stat=5.44 and Z-stat=4.46 for upward_chg and dnward_chg, 
respectively).  The odds ratio on upward_chg (dnward_chg) suggests the likelihood of 
meeting or beating expectations increases 109.7 percent (decreases 43.9 percent) relative 
to the control sample. 
 Panel C and Panel D of this table show the results of the analysis of the 
relationship between the incentives to manage earnings, as originally shown in Table 4.  
The coefficient on the variable of interest, miss_wo*under_over_wo, is insignificant (t 
stat=0.55), suggesting no difference in the magnitude of the change in estimate and the 
desire to manage earnings.  Of the observations that would have missed expectations 
without the change in estimate, however, the size of the changes for those that did meet 
expectations ($0.046 per share) is significantly larger than those that failed to beat 
expectations (-$0.003 per share), suggesting the magnitude may have an association 
when the firms successfully use changes in estimates to manage earnings. 
 In whole, the results shown in Table 8 suggest that the main results are robust to 
at attempt to parse apart firms whose behavior in prior periods suggest they are not 
managing earnings from the rest of the firms. 
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Table 8 
Main Analyses Excluding Firms Not Likely to Manage Earnings 
  
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics
Variable N mean p50 sd N mean p50 sd
meet_beat1 1047 0.729 1.000 0.445 1026 0.711 1.000 0.454
meet_beat2 1047 0.716 1.000 0.451 1026 0.693 1.000 0.461
upward_chg 1047 0.554 1.000 0.497 1026 0.000 0.000 0.000
earn_report 1047 0.285 0.200 0.393 1026 0.266 0.200 0.356
earn_consensus 1047 0.273 0.200 0.381 1026 0.259 0.190 0.352
last_frcst 1045 0.270 0.200 0.417 1025 0.259 0.190 0.384
earn_surprise1 1047 0.012 *** 0.010 0.040 1026 0.007 0.010 0.024
earn_surprise2 1045 0.013 *** 0.010 0.054 1025 0.006 0.010 0.037
effect_eps 1047 0.007 0.002 0.034 1026              -                -                -   
Panel B:  Likelihood to Meet or Beat
Variable Pred Sign Coef. Std. Err. z P>z
upward_chg + 0.740 0.136 5.44 0.000
dnward_chg - -0.579 0.130 -4.46 0.000
book_to_mkt - -0.038 0.040 -0.94 0.346
growth + 0.080 0.175 0.46 0.647
loss - -0.715 0.171 -4.18 0.000
roa + 1.785 1.729 1.03 0.302
size + 0.056 0.036 1.55 0.122
disc_acc + 0.179 2.011 0.09 0.929
meet_beat1_pq + 0.593 0.118 5.03 0.000
Fama-French-17 FE YES
Year Fixed Effects YES
Observations 2,073
Psuedo R2 0.099
Area Under ROC 0.711
Panel C: Influence of the Incentive to Manage Earnings on the Magnitude of the Change in Estimate
Variable Pred. Sign Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
miss_wo + 0.001 0.004 0.32 0.749
under_over_wo ? 0.179 0.077 2.32 0.021
miss_wo*under_over_wo + 0.079 0.144 0.55 0.584
Year Fixed Effects YES
Adjust R2 0.034
Observations 1047
Panel D: Subsample means
Subset effect_eps under_over_wo
miss_wo=1 0.008 0.026
earn_report < earn_consensus -0.003 0.028
earn_report ≥ earn_consensus 0.046 0.022
t-statistic 27.902 *** 3.790 ***
Income increasing changes in estimates Propensity-matched control observations
This table performs earlier analyses on a subset of the original sample which excludes observations that are identified as 
unlikely to record a change in estimate to manage earnings.  These firms are identified by observing whether recognition of the 
change in estimate in a prior period would have allowed the firm to beat expecations.  Panels A, B, C, and D parallel results in
Table 1, Table 3, Panel A of Table 4, and Panel B of Table 4, respectively.  All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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4.3.6 Managing Earnings Through Changes in Estimates for Serial Changers 
 A potential alternative explanation for my results is that my variable of interest 
captures a set of firms that routinely change estimates and that these firms differ 
fundamentally from other firms.  This would imply that my variable of interest identifies 
firms that manage earnings to successfully meet or beat expectations and the effect of 
recognizing a change in estimate is a byproduct this identifying of “serial estimate 
changer” firms.  In effort to address this possibility, I separate the original sample into 
serial changers and observations that belong to firms that do not frequently recognize 
changes in estimates.  I define a serial changer as a firm that recognizes a change in 
estimate in more than half of the years the firm exists in Compustat within 2003 to 
2014.34  If a firm records a change in estimate in more than half of its years, serial_chger 
equals 1 in all quarters.  Serial_chger is 0 for all other observations. 
Table 9 introduces the main effect, serial_chger, and interactions with both 
upward_chg and dnward_chg into Model 1.  If serial changers are fundamentally more 
likely to successfully meet or beat expectations, then I expect a significantly positive 
main effect of serial_chger.  If serial changers are more effective at using changes in 
estimates to beat expectations, the interaction with upward_chg should be positive and 
significant.  If these firms truly drive the results from my original analyses, then the 
coefficient on upward_chg should lose statistical significance. 
                                                 
34 I further require that a firm exist in the 2003 to 2014 window for at least 5 years.  I hesitate to categorize 
a firm that exists for only 3 years and recognizes two changes in estimates in different years as a serial 
changer, and therefore use this threshold to only identify long-lasting firms as potential serial changers. 
 51 
 
The results in Table 9 suggest serial changers do not drive my results.  The 
coefficients on serial_chger, upward_chg*serial_chger, and dnward_chg*serial_chger 
are statistically insignificant (Z-stat of 0.52, 0.93, and 1.39, respectively).  This suggests 
no fundamental difference between serial changer firms and other firms with respect to 
the likelihood to meet or beat expectations, nor do they use changes in estimates to meet 
or beat any differently from firms which infrequently recognize changes in estimates.  
The main effect of upward_chg (dnward_chg) is still positive (negative) and significant 
(Z-stat=5.62 and 5.53, respectively), showing that firms with infrequent use of changes 
in estimates are more (less) likely to meet or beat expectations when they record income 
increasing (decreasing) changes in estimates.  The odds ratios for these are generally 
consistent with earlier results.  Firms with income increasing changes in estimates are 
roughly twice as likely to meet expectations and firms with income decreasing changes 
in estimates are half as likely to meet expectations, relative to the PSM sample. 
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Table 9 
Logistic Regression of Meet or Beat on Changes in Estimates and Serial Changers 
 
Variable Pred Sign Coef. Std. Err. z P>z
upward_chg + 0.760 0.135 5.62 0.000
dnward_chg - -0.714 0.129 -5.53 0.000
serial_chger ? -0.254 0.484 -0.52 0.300
upward_chg*serial_chger ? 0.588 0.630 0.93 0.176
dnward_chg*serial_chger ? 0.930 0.670 1.39 0.083
book_to_mkt - -0.028 0.039 -0.73 0.234
growth + 0.266 0.161 1.65 0.049
loss - -0.900 0.156 -5.76 0.000
roa + 0.817 1.504 0.54 0.294
size + 0.072 0.033 2.17 0.015
disc_acc + -1.495 1.947 -0.77 0.222
meet_beat1_pq + 0.571 0.106 5.40 0.000
Fama-French-17 FE YES
Year Fixed Effects YES
Observations 2,439
Psuedo R2 0.102
Area Under ROC 0.715
This table reports the logistic regression results comparable to those in Table 3, 
however with the inclusion of two additional variables of interest.  All variables 
are defined in Table 1 or herein.  Reported p-values are one tailed.  The sample 
includes all firm-quarter observations with sufficient data from 2003 to 2014 that 
report income increasing changes in estimates and the propensity score matched 
sample of control firms.  Serial_chger is an indicator equal to 1 for all firms 
which report a change in estimate in more than half of the years they exist in 
Compustat.  I further restrict that a firm must exist in Compustat for at least 5 
years to be classified as a serial changer.  I also include the interaction between 
upward_chg and serial_chger to investigate whether firms which routinely report 
changes in estimates are more likely to use them to meet or beat expectations 
relative to firms which infrequently report changes in estimates.
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4.3.7 Importance of a Streak of Meeting or Beating 
 While my primary analyses suggest managers recognize changes in estimates to 
meet or beat analyst expectations, presumably this relationship should strengthen when 
the incentive to meet or beat expectations is stronger.  The first additional analysis, 
shown in Table 4, uses the distance from consensus earnings as a proxy for the strength 
of the incentive, showing a relationship between the size of the change in estimate and 
the distance below consensus earnings.  In effort to take an alternative approach on 
investigating the influence of the incentive, I include the count of consecutive meet or 
beat quarters (streak).  Kross, Ro, and Suk (2011) and Xie (2011) find that maintaining a 
streak of consecutive quarters of meeting or beating expectations is increasingly 
important to managers.  For example, if a firm beat expectations in its second and third 
quarters but not the first, the value of streak for the fourth quarter would be two.  If the 
same firm continues to beat expectations for ten more quarters, then the value of streak 
would be 12.  The incentive to continue the streak grows with the magnitude, suggesting 
a value of 12 for streak indicates stronger incentive to manage earnings than a value of 
two.  I therefore include the main effect of streak into Model 1 as well as an interaction 
with upward_chg.  If the streak provides additional incentive to use changes in estimates 
to beat expectations, I would expect the coefficient on the interaction term to be positive 
and significant. 
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Table 10 
Logistic Regression of Meet or Beat on Changes in Estimates and Streaks in 
Meeting Expectations 
  Panel A: Meet or Beat Consensus
Variable Pred Sign Coef. Std. Err. z P>z
upward_chg + 0.938 0.156 6.02 0.000
dnward_chg - -0.760 0.156 -4.88 0.000
streak + 0.062 0.015 4.23 0.000
upward_chg*streak ? -0.041 0.025 -1.66 0.049
dnward_chg*streak ? 0.042 0.033 1.28 0.101
book_to_mkt - -0.013 0.039 -0.33 0.372
growth + 0.278 0.161 1.73 0.042
loss - -0.877 0.157 -5.58 0.000
roa + 0.805 1.512 0.53 0.297
size + 0.030 0.034 0.91 0.183
disc_acc + -1.518 1.952 -0.78 0.219
meet_beat1_pq + 0.275 0.119 2.31 0.011
Fama-French-17 FE YES
Year Fixed Effects YES
Observations 2,439
Psuedo R2 0.113
Area Under ROC 0.728
Panel B: Meet or Beat Last Forecast
Variable Pred Sign Coef. Std. Err. z P>z
upward_chg + 0.638 0.146 4.35 0.000
dnward_chg - -0.729 0.151 -4.83 0.000
streak + 0.032 0.014 2.33 0.010
upward_chg*streak ? 0.006 0.027 0.2 0.420
dnward_chg*streak ? 0.087 0.035 2.46 0.007
book_to_mkt - -0.025 0.038 -0.65 0.259
growth + 0.280 0.157 1.78 0.038
loss - -0.697 0.154 -4.52 0.000
roa + 0.435 1.485 0.29 0.385
size + -0.004 0.031 -0.14 0.444
disc_acc + 1.616 1.879 0.86 0.195
meet_beat2_pq + 0.302 0.114 2.65 0.004
Fama-French-17 FE YES
Year Fixed Effects YES
Observations 2,439
Psuedo R2 0.078
Area Under ROC 0.684
This table reports the logistic regression results comparable to those in Table 3, 
however with the inclusion of two additional variables of interest.  All variables 
are defined in Table 1 or herein.  Reported p-values are one tailed.  The sample 
includes all firm-quarter observations with sufficient data from 2003 to 2014 that 
report income increasing changes in estimates and the propensity score matched 
sample of control firms.  Streak is the count of consecutive quarters leading into 
the observation in which the firm has met or exceeded expectations.  I also 
include the interaction between upward_chg and streak to investigate whether 
firms with longer streaks of meeting or beating are more likely to use changes in 
estimates to meet expectations.
 55 
 
 Table 10 shows the results of the analyses of the interaction of using changes in 
estimates and the increased incentive to meet or beat expectations.  Panel A defines 
expectations as the consensus analyst forecast (meet_beat1).  The main effects of 
upward_chg (coef=0.938, Z-stat=6.02) and streak (coef=0.062, Z-stat=4.23) are both 
positive and significant, suggesting both are associated with a higher likelihood of 
meeting or beating consensus forecasts.  The coefficient on dnward_chg (coef=-0.760, 
Z-stat=4.88) is still negative and significant, suggesting these changes in estimates are 
associated with a lower likelihood of meeting expectations.  The interaction 
(upward_chg*streak), however, is significantly negative (coef=-0.041, Z-stat=1.66) 
suggesting firms are less likely to use changes in estimates to meet or beat consensus 
forecast as the length of the streak of consecutive periods of meeting expectations 
increases.  The coefficient on dnward_chg*streak is insignificant.  Panel B shows the 
same analysis but with expectations defined as the last forecast (meet_beat2).  Results 
for the main effects of upward_chg, dnward_chg, and streak are consistent with those in 
Panel A.  The interactions, however, show different results with upward_chg*streak 
having no significance and dnward_chg*streak significant and positive (coef=0.087, Z-
stat=2.46). 
 These results unfortunately do not provide conclusive evidence that the strength 
of the incentive to manage earnings influences the use of changes in estimates to meet or 
beat.  While they seem to contradict the results in Section 4.3.1, they still support the 
primary findings that changes in estimates are associated with a higher likelihood of 
meeting or beating expectations. 
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The earnings management literature has established that managers use accruals to 
meet certain thresholds, including analyst expectations.  This paper provides evidence of 
this phenomena using disclosure of changes in estimates.  My findings suggest that 
managers recognize changes in estimates advantageously to meet or beat analyst 
expectations and that the magnitude of the change is associated with the strength of the 
incentive to manage earnings.  I focus on changes in estimates since they exemplify 
manager action with discretionary accounts.  This study complements earnings 
management studies using specific financial statement line items such as bad debt 
expense (Teoh et al. 1998), claim loss reserves (Beatty et al. 2002; Nelson, 2000), and 
taxes (Dhaliwal et al. 2004) by identifying a disclosure which evidences earnings 
management through such accounts.  The incremental contribution of my paper is that I 
examine a broader set of specifically identified accruals.  My findings are corroborated 
by a series of additional analyses which focus on the relationship between changes in 
estimates and meeting expectations relative to other comparison groups, across other 
periods, and in different subsets.  I find that firms have a higher likelihood to meet 
expectations in periods in which they record changes in estimates, relative to themselves 
in other periods.  They also have similar meet or beat earnings management behavior to 
firms that later restate earnings downward for estimate accounts.  These firms reap no 
incremental benefit in contiguous quarters.  Specifically, they are no different in 
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likelihood to meet or beat in either the quarter preceding or the quarter following 
recognition of a change in estimate relative to a control group without changes in 
estimates.  In aggregate, I provide convincing evidence that firms use changes in 
estimates advantageously. 
 While I examine the use of changes in estimates to manage earnings, I do not 
perform an in-depth analysis of which specific estimate accounts are used.  I believe this 
could be a fertile area of future research that may further add to our understanding of 
accruals management.  I also only examine the incentive to meet or beat analyst 
expectations.  Other incentives to manage earnings may provide similar motivation to 
recognize changes in estimates; investigation of other incentives may shed light on the 
breadth of the association between changes in estimates and earnings management.  
Additionally, my results do not speak to the value relevance of changes in estimate 
disclosures for investors.  It is difficult to isolate market response to a single disclosure 
contained in 10-K or 10-Q reports, however this is another potential area of future 
research.  It may be of interest to determine if auditors or those charged with corporate 
governance influence whether changes in estimates are recorded with or without 
managerial bias.  In summary, changes in estimates provide an interesting area for future 
research. 
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APPENDIX A  
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Name Description 
Variables of Interest 
upward_chg 1 if the effect of the change in estimate increases income 
in the current period; 0 otherwise. 
effect_eps Magnitude of the income effect of the estimate change in 
quarter t, scaled by outstanding shares for diluted earnings 
per share.  Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
earn_report Reported per-share earnings for quarter t, from I/B/E/S.  
Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
consensus Average per-share earnings forecast from the final analyst 
forecast before quarter end of quarter t.  Winsorized at 1% 
and 99%. 
last_frcst Final analyst forecast for quarter t prior to period end.  
Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
meet_beat1 1 if the firm’s reported earnings exceed the consensus 
forecast; 0 otherwise. 
meet_beat2 1 if the firm’s reported earnings exceed the last analyst 
forecast; 0 otherwise. 
earn_surprise1 The difference between reported earnings and consensus 
earnings.  Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
earn_surprise2 The difference between reported earnings and the last 
analyst forecast.  Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
act_cadj Reported earnings less the consensus forecast with the 
effect of the change in estimate removed from earnings.  If 
an observation does not have a change in estimate then this 
is equal to the earnings surprise. 
Controls for Main Models 
book_to_mkt The ratio of the book value of equity to the market value 
of equity. 
growth The growth rate of quarterly sales relative to the same 
quarter in the prior year. 
loss 1 if earnings for the quarter are negative; 0 otherwise. 
ROA Ratio of quarterly income before extraordinary items to 
total assets for quarter t. 
size Natural logarithm of the market value of equity. 
Tobins_Q The ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of 
assets. 
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Name Description 
accruals Total accruals from the Collins et al. (2017) model with 
quarterly dummies for ROA, sales growth, and market-to-
book quintiles. 
disc_acc Signed abnormal accruals from the Collins et al. (2017) 
model with quarterly dummies for ROA, sales growth and 
market-to-book quintiles. 
Additional Variables for Magnitude Model 
under_over_wo The difference between consensus per-share earnings and 
reported per share earnings excluding the income effect of 
the change in estimate. 
miss_wo 1 if the firm would have missed consensus without the 
change in estimate; 0 otherwise. 
Additional Variables for Restatement Versus Change in Estimate Analysis 
est_adj The per share magnitude of the effect of the estimate 
adjustment.  This is the same as effect_eps for observations 
with changes in estimates.  It is calculated as the difference 
between restated earnings per share and earnings per share 
as first reported. 
true_earn Reported earnings less the income effect of the change in 
estimate or plus the income effect of the restatement, 
depending on the type of adjustment. 
true_beat 1 if true_earn meets or exceeds earn_consensus; 0 
otherwise. 
Additional Variables for Serial Changers Analysis 
serial_chger 1 if the firm recognizes a change in estimate in 50 percent 
or more of the years it exists in Compustat between 2003 
and 2014, conditional on it existing in Compustat during 
that period for a minimum of five years; 0 otherwise. 
Additional Variables for Streak Analysis 
streak The count of consecutive quarters preceding quarter t in 
which the firm has met or exceeded consensus forecast. 
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APPENDIX B  
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES IN ESTIMATES 
 
Tables B1 and B2 provide descriptive information on the nature of observations 
with changes in estimates.  Table B1 breaks out all 1,237 changes in estimates into the 
Fama-French 17 Industry categories.  The largest portion of the sample reside in the 
Other category, with 267 (249) of the income increasing (decreasing) observations.  
Machinery and Business Equipment contains the next largest portion of the sample, with 
116 (84) income increasing (decreasing) changes in estimates.  The columns of Table B1 
break out the category tags for the changes in estimate.  These categories do not easily 
reconcile to the total observations per Industry category since changes in estimates may 
have several tags.  For example, the two income increasing changes in estimates in the 
Mining and Minerals Industry have tags for depreciation method, restructuring, and 
accruals.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, changes in estimates tagged as accruals comprise of a 
large portion of observations, with 317 observations having the change categorized as 
impacting accruals.  Restructuring (200 observations), property, plant, & equipment 
(184), and executive compensation (155) are the next three most frequently tagged 
categories for changes in estimates. 
Table B2 provides insight into the temporal trends in changes in estimates.  Panel 
A shows the year-to-year totals of changes in estimates, with peaks occurring in 2006 
(83 income increasing and 64 income decreasing observations) and 2009 (85 increasing 
income and 63 decreasing income).  Very few changes in estimates occur in 2003 or 
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2004, however the frequency of income increasing changes remains in the fifty to ninety 
range with the exception of 2012 (36 observations) and 2013 (45).  Income decreasing 
changes in estimates show a similar pattern, with frequencies staying within the forty to 
seventy range after 2004.  Similar to the columns in Table B1, Table B2 provides detail 
on the tagged categories of changes in estimates for the detail totaled in the row detail.  
Changes in estimates pertaining to executive compensation and options escalate from 
2006 to 2009.  Changes in estimates tagged as issues pertaining to revenue contracts pick 
up in 2013 and 2014 with 10 and 18 income increasing (21 and 18 income decreasing) 
observations, respectively. 
Panel B shows the frequency of recognition of changes in estimate by fiscal 
quarter.  The first (192 observations) and fourth (192) quarters have more income 
increasing changes in estimates than the second (138) and third quarters (134).  Income 
decreasing changes in estimate also occur most frequently in the fourth quarter (221 
observations), however the first three quarters are comparable in frequency of changes 
(139, 120, and 101 observations for the first, second, and third quarters, respectively).  
Acquisition and restructuring related changes in estimates occur more frequently in the 
first and fourth quarters, as do changes in accrual-related estimates. 
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TABLE B1 
Industry and Category Breakdown of Changes in Estimates 
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Income Increasing Changes in Estimates
Food 11    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        2    -      -        3      1    -      -      -      -        3      2    -      -      -      -        2    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        2    -   
Mining and Minerals 2    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1    -        1    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -   
Oil & Petrolium Products 12    -      -      -      -        2    -      -      -        1      1      1      4      1      1    -      -      -      -        2    -      -      -        1      2    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1    -   
Textiles, Apparel & Footware 7    -      -      -        2    -      -      -      -        1    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        2    -        1    -        1      2    -      -      -      -      -        2    -      -      -      -        1    -   
Consumer Durables 5    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        2    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1      1      2    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        2      1 
Chemicals 11    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1    -      -        3    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        3    -        4    -        1    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1      2 
Drugs, Soap, Prfums, Tobacco 30    -      -      -        1    -      -      -      -        2    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1      2    -        7    -        9      2    -      -      -        5    -      -        6      6      1    -        2      1 
Construction and Construction Materials 10    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1    -      -        1    -      -      -      -      -      -        1      2    -      -        3      1      1    -      -      -        4    -      -      -      -      -        1    -   
Steel Works Etc 8    -      -      -      -        2    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1      2    -      -        2    -        2    -        1    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1 
Fabricated Products 8    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        2    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1      2      3    -      -      -      -      -        2    -      -      -      -      -      -        1 
Machinery and Business Equipment 116      3    -      -        9    -      -      -      -      16      1      1      8      2    -      -      -        1      1    13      1    32    13    48    13      1    -      -        4      4    -      -      -      -      -      16    14 
Automobiles 9    -      -      -        2    -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1    -      -      -      -      -      -        1      1      3      2      6      1    -      -      -      -        1    -      -      -      -      -      -      -   
Transportation 44    -      -      -        2    -      -      -      -        1      1      5      5    -      -      -      -      -      -        4      5    -        1      7      4    -      -      -        2    20      1    -      -      -      -        1      1 
Utilities 16    -      -      -      -        1    -      -      -      -        1    -        6      1      1    -      -      -      -        2    -        1    -        1      2      2    -      -        1      1    -      -      -      -      -      -        1 
Retail Stores 42    -      -      -        1    -        1    -      -      13    -      -        6    -      -      -      -        1      1      1      1      6    -        8      2    -      -      -        1    -        8    -        1      1    -      13      1 
Banks, Insurance Companies, and Other Financials 58      3    -        3      5    -      -      -      -      13    -        1      3      1    -      -      -      -      -        7      4    -      -        8      7    -      -      -        6    -        1    -      -      -      -      13    13 
Other 267      8    -        1    21      1    -      -      -      30      1    10    27      4    -      -      -      -      -      20    11    60      4    88    20      1    -        2    27    18      1    -        3      3      1    27    30 
Income Decreasing Changes in Estimates
Food 18    -      -      -      -      -      -        1    -        2    -      -        8    -      -      -      -      -        3    -        1      1    -        3      1      2    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        2    -   
Mining and Minerals 1    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1    -      -      -        1      1    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -   
Oil & Petrolium Products 17    -      -      -      -      16    -      -      -      -      -      -        1    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -   
Textiles, Apparel & Footware 4    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        2    -        2    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1 
Consumer Durables 6    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1    -      -        2    -      -      -      -      -        1    -      -        2    -        2    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1    -   
Chemicals 10    -      -      -        1      2    -      -      -        3    -      -        2    -      -        1    -      -      -      -      -        1    -        2      1    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        3    -   
Drugs, Soap, Prfums, Tobacco 30    -      -      -        1    -      -      -      -        3      1    -        5    -      -      -      -      -      -        2    -        3    -        3      3    -      -      -        3      3    -        2      6      2    -        3    -   
Construction and Construction Materials 17    -      -        1    -      -      -      -      -        1    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        2    -      -        5      5      2    -      -      -      -        8    -      -      -      -      -      -      -   
Steel Works Etc 5    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        2    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1    -        2    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -   
Fabricated Products 6    -      -      -        1    -      -      -      -      -      -        1      3    -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1    -        1      2    -      -      -      -      -        1    -      -      -      -      -      -      -   
Machinery and Business Equipment 84      1    -      -        4      1    -      -      -      17      1    -        6    -      -      -      -        1      1      7    -      14      6    22      7      1    -      -      -      23    -      -        1    -      -      17      5 
Automobiles 3    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1    -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -        1    -      -        1    -      -      -      -      -      -      -   
Transportation 44    -      -      -        1    -      -      -      -        1      1      4      5    -      -      -      -      -      -        2    -        1    -        2      2    -      -        1    -      30      1    -      -      -      -        1    -   
Utilities 24      1    -      -      -        9    -      -      -        1      2    -        5    -      -      -      -      -      -        3    -      -      -        4      3    -      -      -        2    -      -      -      -      -      -        1      1 
Retail Stores 39    -      -      -        1    -        1    -      -        5    -      -        7    -      -      -        1      1      4      7    -        8    -      12      8    -      -      -        1    -        3    -        1    -      -        5      2 
Banks, Insurance Companies, and Other Financials 24    -      -        1    -      -      -      -        1      9    -      -        3    -        1    -      -      -      -        1      1      1    -        5      2    -      -      -        2    -      -      -      -      -      -        9      1 
Other 249      4    -      -      19      5    -      -      -      29      2      3    64      1    -        1    -        1      4    22      1    49    -      59    23    -      -        6    19    13      1      4      3    -      -      28    16 
Total 1237    20    -        6    71    39      2      1      1  155    13    26  184    11      3      2      1      6    21  104    29  200    35  317  111    12      1      9    73  129    18    12    21      7      1  150    92 
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TABLE B2 
Temporal and Categorical Breakdown of Changes in Estimates 
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Income Increasing Changes in Estimates
2003 10 - - - 1    - - - - 1     - - 1     - - - - - - 1     - 4     - 5     1     1    - - - -  - - 1    - - 1     - 
2004 25 - - - 1    - - - - -  - - 3     - - - - 1    1    -  - 11   1    13   -  - - - 2    -  - - - - - -  6    
2005 51 3    - - - 1    - - - 2     - 3    5     - - - - 1    1    4     3    16   1    24   4     1    - - 2    -  2    1    1    - - 2     6    
2006 83 2    - 1    1    - - - - 12   2    3    8     2    1    - - 1    1    11   4    22   1    32   11   - - - 2    -  3    1    - 1    - 12   7    
2007 70 3    - - 4    1    - - - 11   - 1    8     2    - - - - - 5     1    13   3    20   5     1    - - 6    1     - 1    3    1    - 11   5    
2008 60 - - 1    2    - - - - 16   1    - 9     1    - - - - - 1     2    11   1    15   1     - - - 3    3     - 2    1    2    - 16   8    
2009 85 4    - 1    5    1    - - - 22   1    - 4     - - - - - 1    4     2    15   4    23   4     - - 1    8    5     3    - - - - 21   7    
2010 71 1    - 1    8    2    - - - 5     - 2    7     2    1    - - - 3    10   3    7     5    18   10   - - - 7    3     2    - 1    - - 4     7    
2011 58 - - - 13  - 1    - - 5     - 2    7     - - - - - 1    13   2    9     2    17   14   1    - - 3    5     1    - - - - 5     5    
2012 36 - - - 2    - - - - 1     - 3    5     1    - - - - - 2     3    2     2    8     2     1    - - 1    5     - 1    3    1    1    -  4    
2013 45 1    - - 2    1    - - - 5     2    3    6     - - - - - - 3     2    -  2    4     3     1    - - 5    10   - - - - - 5     6    
2014 62 - - - 4    - - - - 3     - 1    6     2    - - - - - 3     3    8     1    13   3     1    - 1    7    18   2    - - - - 3     5    
Income Decreasing Changes in Estimates
2003 5 - - - - - - - - -  - - 2     - - - - - - -  - 3     - 3     -  - - - - -  - - - - - -  - 
2004 23 1    - - 3    1    - - - -  1    - 7     - - - - - - 5     - 5     - 6     5     - - - - -  - - 1    - - -  2    
2005 51 - - 1    4    - - - - 4     - - 13   - - - - 1    3    10   - 9     1    18   10   - 1     1    1    -  - - 1    - - 4     2    
2006 64 1    - - 4    1    - - - 9     1    - 17   - - - - - - 3     1    11   - 16   3     2    - - 2    2     - 2    2    - - 9     3    
2007 58 - - - 2    2    1    - - 14   - - 8     - - - 1     - 3    5     1    9     - 12   6     1    - - 4    3     - 1    1    1    - 14   2    
2008 64 1    - - 1    6    - - - 8     1    - 11   - - - - 1    1    4     - 15   2    18   4     - - - 1    2     1    1    4    1    - 8     5    
2009 63 1    - - 3    6    - - 1    11   1    3    10   - - - - - 1    1     1    14   - 17   2     - - - 2    7     2    - - - - 11   3    
2010 51 - - - 2    3    - - - 6     - 2    9     - 1    - - - 1    7     - 9     2    14   7     - - - 2    8     - - 1    - - 6     3    
2011 44 - - 1    4    3    - - - 4     3    1    8     1    - 1    - 1    2    7     - 3     2    8     8     - - 1    4    5     - 1    - - - 4     1    
2012 47 2    - - - 4    - - - 5     - 1    12   - - - - - - -  - -  1    2     1     1    - 2    7    13   - 1    1    - - 5     - 
2013 49 - - - - 4    - - - 4     - - 10   - - 1    - - - -  1    -  1    2     1     - - 1    3    21   2    - - - - 4     2    
2014 62 - - - 5    3    - 1     - 7     - 1    8     - - - - - 2    5     - 4     3    9     6     1    - 2    1    18   - - - - - 5     3    
Total 1237 20  - 6    71  39  2    1     1    155 13  26  184 11  3    2    1     6    21  104 29  200 35  317 111 12  1     9    73  129 18  12  21  7    1    150 92  
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Income Increasing Changes in Estimates
First 192 2    - 3    11  1    - - - 24   4    9    32   5    1    - - 1    1    10   8    39   9    63   10   1    - 2    10  17   1    2    - - 1    24   11  
Second 138 4    - - 8    - - - - 15   - 2    15   1    - - - 2    4    18   7    22   5    38   18   2    - - 9    13   5    2    3    1    - 14   11  
Third 134 1    - - 8    2    1    - - 25   2    - 8     3    - - - - 3    8     3    19   1    32   9     1    - - 12  12   2    1    5    3    - 25   18  
Fourth 192 7    - 1    16  3    - - - 19   - 7    14   1    1    - - - - 21   7    38   8    59   21   3    - - 15  8     5    1    2    1    - 17   26  
Income Decreasing Changes in Estimates
First 139 1    - 1    3    9    - - - 33   3    1    31   1    1    1    - - - 7     - 22   4    35   8     - - 1    3    11   - 1    1    - - 33   4    
Second 120 1    - - 9    4    1    - 1    15   1    2    18   - - - - 1    4    15   1    17   1    24   18   3    - 1    5    16   3    1    4    - - 15   4    
Third 101 - - 1    7    3    - 1     - 9     2    3    13   - - 1    - 1    2    12   - 12   3    18   14   - 1     3    6    15   1    2    2    2    - 8     7    
Fourth 221 4    - - 9    17  - - - 15   1    2    53   - - - 1     1    7    13   3    31   4    48   13   2    - 2    13  37   1    2    4    - - 14   11  
Total 1237 20  - 6    71  39  2    1     1    155 13  26  184 11  3    2    1     6    21  104 29  200 35  317 111 12  1     9    73  129 18  12  21  7    1    150 92  
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APPENDIX C  
IDENTIFYING ESTIMATE RESTATEMENTS 
 
The tables below show the links between change in estimate categories and 
restatement categories.  Category titles are taken from Audit Analytics Changes in 
Estimates and Restatements databases.  The linking of estimate categories to restatement 
categories is used to develop an alternative control group for testing the determinants of 
reporting a change in estimate.  This alternative control group contains all firm-year 
observations that were subsequently restated for one of the below titles.  These 
restatements therefore pertain to estimate accounts which, had the information been 
known by managers at the time, should have been originally disclosed as changes in 
estimates. 
Change in Estimate and Restatement Link 
Change in Estimate Description Corresponding Restatement 
Description 
Accounts/loans receivable & cash issues; 
allowance for doubtful accounts; fair 
value and valuation of investment 
securities (AR); loans receivable 
valuation and loss reserve 
Accounts/loans receivable, investments & 
cash issues 
Acquisitions (esp. purchase price adj.), 
mergers, disposals, re-organizations 
Acquisitions, mergers, disposals, re-org 
acct issues 
Asset retirement obligations Asset retirement issues 
Capitalization of expenditures issues – 
prepaid assets, other assets, etc. 
Capitalization of expenditures issues 
Consolidation, foreign currency/inflation, 
etc. 
Consolidation issues incl Fin 46 variable 
interest  & off-B/S; Consolidation, 
foreign currency/inflation (subcategory) 
issue 
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Change in Estimate Description Corresponding Restatement 
Description 
Debt, quasi-debt, warrants & equity 
(BCF) security 
Debt and/or equity classification issues; 
Debt, quasi-debt, warrants & equity 
(BCF) security issues 
Deferred, stock-based and/or executive 
comp 
Deferred, stock-based and/or executive 
comp issues; Deferred, stock-based 
options backdating only (subcategory); 
Deferred, stock-based SFAS 123 only 
(subcategory) 
Depreciation, depletion or amortization; 
change in depreciation or amortization 
method; change in estimated salvage 
value; change in estimated useful life 
Depreciation, depletion or amortization 
errors 
Expenses (payroll, SGA, other) Expense (payroll, SGA, other) recording 
issues 
Financial derivatives/hedging Financial derivatives/hedging (FAS 133) 
acct issues 
Intercompany, investment in 
subs./affiliate, etc. 
Foreign, related party, affiliated, or 
subsidiary issues; Foreign, subsidiary 
only issues (subcategory); Intercompany, 
investment in  subs./affiliate issues; 
Intercompany, only, (subcategory) - 
accounting issues 
Inventory - lower of cost or market; 
reserve for obsolete and slow moving 
inventory; Inventory, vendor and/or cost 
of sales 
Inventory, vendor and/or cost of sales 
issues 
Lease, legal, contingencies, commitments 
etc. 
Lease,  SFAS 5, legal, contingency and 
commitment issues; Lease, leasehold and 
FAS 13 (98) only (subcategory) 
Liabilities - insurance loss reserve 
including IBNR; restructuring reserve; 
warranty reserves; Liabilities, accruals or 
reserves 
Liabilities, payables, reserves and accrual 
estimate failures 
Pension and other post-retirement benefit; 
Pensions - discount rate selection 
Pension and other post-retirement benefit 
issues 
PPE & Intangible assets; valuation or 
impairment of fixed assets 
PPE intangible or fixed asset 
(value/diminution) issues 
PPE & Intangible assets - valuation or 
impairment of intangible assets and 
goodwill only 
PPE issues - Intangible assets, goodwill 
only (subcategory) 
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Change in Estimate Description Corresponding Restatement 
Description 
Revenue recognition; contract accounting 
including percentage-of-completion; gift 
cards and aircraft miles breakage; 
milestone payments and licensing fees; 
sales returns and allowances; vendors 
rebates and allowances 
Revenue recognition issues; Gain or loss 
recognition issues 
Tax expense/benefit/deferral/other, inc. 
valuation allowance 
Tax - FIN 48 Additional Paid-In Capital 
Affected; FIN 48 Deferred Tax Assets 
Affected; FIN 48 Deferred Tax Liability 
Affected; FIN 48 Estimate Only of F/S 
Effect  Provided; FIN 48 Liabilities for 
Interest and Penalties Affected; FIN 48 
Liabilities For Taxes Payable Affected; 
FIN 48 Misc.Account Affected; FIN 48 
Reclass among BS accounts noted; FIN 
48 Reserve For Uncertain Tax Position 
Affected; FIN 48 Retained Earnings 
Cumulative Adjustment; FIN 48 Statutory 
Tax Periods Noted; FIN 48 Tax  Asset 
Valuation Allowance Affected; FIN 48 
Tax Receivables Affected; FIN 48 
Unaffected or Unidentified Affects; FIN 
48 Uncertain Tax Position Liability; FIN 
48 Unrecognized Tax Benefit Liability 
Affected; Tax 
expense/benefit/deferral/other (FAS 109) 
issues 
Other accounting estimates GAAP - Changes in Acct Principles 
FASB/EITF or Foreign GAAP; SAB 108 
Change in Accounting Policy; SAB 108 
Change in Estimate; SAB 108 
Miscellaneous Adjustments; SAB 108 
reversals of previous restated amounts 
 
Omitted Restatement Categories 
Balance sheet classification of assets issues 
Cash flow statement (SFAS 95) classification errors 
Comprehensive income issues 
EPS, ratio and classification of income statement issues 
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Fin Statement,  footnote & segment disclosure issues 
Proforma financial information reporting issues 
Restatements made while in bankruptcy/receivership 
Retrospective revisions to p/y financials for consistency 
Unspecified (amounts or accounts)  restatement adjustments 
Audit or auditor related restatements or nonreliance 
Audit(or) - adj not booked by Co (subcategory) 
Audit(or) - defective acct records (subcategory) 
Audit(or) consent re opinion in f/s issues (subcategory) 
Audit(or) inability to rely on Co reps (subcategory) 
Audit(or) Independence/PCAOB reg issues (subcategory) 
Capital adequacy and calculation issues 
Loan covenant violations/issues 
Registration/security (incl debt) issuance issues 
Material Weakness - Section 404 or 302 issues identified 
 
Estimate Categories with no Corresponding Restatement Category 
SEC comment letter disclosure 
Stock-based compensation - forfeiture rate, vesting, and valuation estimates 
 
Examples of Estimate Disclosures 
The following demonstrates different disclosure for a revision of the same asset from 
two separate firms.  Both firms revised the information set applicable to deferred tax 
assets, however one firm disclosed it as a change in estimate and the other firm disclosed 
it subsequently as a restatement.  The key difference in these is the determination of 
when information became available. 
Change in Estimate – From Aaon, Inc. 2013 annual report 
“The Company also had a change in estimate related to the recoverability of 
certain 2012 tax credits that was recorded in the first quarter of 2013 for 
approximately $0.6 million. This change in estimate was the result of additional 
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and better information. Had the ATRA impact and the change in estimate been 
booked in 2012 instead of 2013, our overall effective tax rate would have been 
approximately 35.5% for the year ended December 31, 2012.” 
Restatement – From Radnet, Inc. 2013 annual report regarding 2012 information: 
“In November 2013, during a review of the Company’s work papers supporting 
its deferred tax assets, management discovered an error in the historical tax 
treatment of certain mark-to-market adjustments recorded in relation to its 
interest rate swaps, dating back as far as 2009. This error caused the Company’s 
deferred tax assets to be overstated by approximately $4.3 million and 
unrecognized tax benefit liability (included in accounts payable, accrued 
expenses and other) to be understated by approximately $0.4 million at 
December 31, 2012.” 
Both disclosures indicate information existed regarding elements within the deferred tax 
asset valuation.  Radnet’s disclosure suggests management was unaware of this 
information until the subsequent year, and therefore the firm restated. 
The intended purpose of assessing the determinants of a change in accounting estimate 
relative to a subsequent restatement of estimates is to ascertain what characteristics of 
either the firm or the auditor lead to new information becoming incorporated into 
valuation assumptions in the period of origination of the information. 
 
